Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act: Health Care Institutions by Feheley, Lawrence F.
AMENDMENTS TO THE NATIONAL LABOR




The National Labor Relations Act has governed the labor rela-
tions of millions of workers since its enactment in 1935. In its original
form it was deemed to be applicable to private non-profit hospitals,
but the Taft-Hartley Amendments of 1947 specifically exempted
employees of private non-profit hospitals from the Act's purview.
Distressed by the frequency and consequences of recognitional strikes
in the health care industry, Congress recently undertook to balance
the interests and rights of employers, employees, and the public in
order to provide stability and regularity to employment in the health
care industry. The result was a set of amendments to the National
Labor Relations Act which were designed to establish and facilitate
collective bargaining, reduce the opportunity for negotiation im-
passes, and, most important, recognize and protect the public interest
in the continuity of health care.
On July 26, 1974, President Nixon signed the new amendments
into law. Ironically, on that same day the California Nurses' Associa-
tion reached a tentative agreement on a contract with three hospital
associations (which had affected forty-two Northern California hos-
pitals and clinics), thus ending a three-week strike in California. The
fear of just such life-endangering strikes was an obvious argument
against the legislation designed to sanction colletive bargaining in
hospitals. However, the provisions of the approved bill, making bar-
gaining the subject of a full panoply of unique provisions, could
possibly have avoided the much-publicized strike in California. In
this regard, many people feel that the bill, and certainly its legislative
impetus, is prophylactic in nature and that it is designed to control
and confine economic labor activity in the health care situation,
rather than being a concession or favor to organized labor. As such,
the legislation appears to be a perhaps uncomfortable merger of the
dual postulates of employee rights and public protection.
It is evident from a review of the form and content of the new
legislation that Congress recognized that the public interest in health
care, whether served by proprietary or non-profit institutions, re-
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quired special consideration in the Act. The uniqueness of the health
care industry led Congress to add special provisions to the Act which
were designed to accomodate the special need of the health care
industry to provide continuous patient care. The portions of the Act
so tailored include the enactment of notice requirements to an em-
ployer and federal and state conciliatory agencies, mandatory partici-
pation in mediation efforts, and advance notice requirements prior to
strike or picketing activity. Senator Taft expressed the view that:
This legislation clearly reflects the Congressional recognition that
health care is significantly different enough from other aspects of
the economy to merit special protections and procedures under the
act.1
The health care field is a distinct industry due to the nature of
the employers involved, the nature of the services rendered, and the
nature of the labor relations encountered. Health care institutions are
sparsely concentrated throughout the country, and many serve an
expansive area, both in terms of number of patients and distance
from similar alternative services. In prior years, when only segments
of the industry were within the purview of the Act, the effects of a
crippling labor dispute at one of the covered institutions were miti-
gated by the existence of alternative sources of health care available
at non-profit and governmental institutions (which composed the
majority of the total number of health care institutions). The obvious
concern, therefore, is that assertion of jurisdiction over all such enti-
ties will exacerbate the implications of labor disputes at health care
institutions. Moreover, the nature of the newly-covered employer is
such that in many instances no viable alternatives for the affected
services exist to replace those lost to labor disputes. The lack of
appropriate alternatives stems from the fact that (a) many health
service employers are located in predominately rural areas where a
single institution, often small, provides health services for a large
geographical area, and (b) many health service employers are en-
gaged in providing specialized services to patients or other institu-
tions, for which no readily available replacements exist.2
Another unique aspect of the health care industry involves the
nature of the services rendered by the employers. The only commod-
ity marketed by health care institutions is a personal service, which
often requires speedy administration and is directly concerned with
' 120 CONG. REC. 7311 (daily ed. May 7, 1974).
2 Such specialized services include psychiatric clinics, asthmatic services, chest disease
centers, tuberculosis sanitariums, rehabilitation centers and assorted other varieties of institu-
tions dedicated to the treatment of particularlized disorders.
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the health, indeed sometimes the life or death, of its patrons. The
essential concern for the welfare of patients is a variable not en-
countered in more traditional labor disputes. In this regard, Senator
Dominick commented:
Hospital care is not storable. It is essentially an immediate service
to the sick and injured. There is no stockpile from which to draw,
no storage yard, or warehouse backup potential as that found in
many business fields. If the health care nurse, radiologic technician,
laboratory technologist, electroencephalographic technician, physi-
cal therapist, surgical nurse, critical care nurse specialist, and many
other numerous health care specialists are not at or near the bedside
or responsive on call to the need of patients, the hospital ceases to
function and the public interest is immediately downgraded and its
welfare endangered.'
A third distinguishing feature of the health care industry is the
inapplicability of various traditional labor relations concepts. Not all
of the normal legal fictions imposed on the power relationships inher-
ent in labor-management confrontation are readily transferred to the
health care situation. The involvement of the public tends to blur the
traditional line between management and labor; economic pressures
brought to bear on health care institutions affect the public perhaps
more critically than the employer. It is the availability of health
services, and not necessarily employer profits, that is compromised.
As such, the struggle between labor and management may be illusory
if the employer is placed in a position where he has no real power to
say "no" to union demands. The right to strike is seen generally by
unions as the "ultimate" weapon in the labor-management struggle.
The denial of this right to health care employees is deemed appropri-
ate by some, due to the fact that a health care institution cannot
respond with the "ultimate" weapon available to private sector
employers-closing the business down. This consideration would sug-
gest that settlement of labor disputes in the health care industry is
basically not an economic or market-oriented process and that reli-
ance on the economic power concept as the catalyst and goad to
resolution of labor disputes may be misplaced.
The regulation of labor relations in health care institutions in-
volves a policy decision; its resolution depends on whether the ques-
tion is seen in terms of labor-management relationships or in terms
of the insured availability of public health care. Congress has at-
tempted to strike a balance between the rights of employees to bar-
S. REP. No. 93-766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1974) (individual views of Sen. Dominick).
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gain and the right of the public to receive uninterrupted health care.
The special status accorded to health care institutions in the amend-
ments demands equally special and considered treatment by the
Board and the courts.
A. Historical Bankground
To provide perspective for an analysis of the new legislation it
is instructive to recount briefly the evolutionary history of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act as it has applied to private non-profit
hospitals. In the Preamble of the National Labor Relations Act,
Congress noted that the denial of the right of employees to organize
and the refusal to accept the procedure of collective bargaining had
led to strikes and other forms of industrial strife and unrest.4
By recognizing that strikes directly and immediately burden or
obstruct interstate commerce, Congress was able to assert its
tentacle-like legislative power in the labor area. The National Labor
Relations Board has relied upon this rationale in establishing as a test
of its own jurisdiction the immediacy and directness of the effect upon
interstate commerce of the activity in question.5 Thus, a subtle legal
framework has been constructed which permits the Board to balance
various factors in deciding whether to exercise jurisdiction over non-
profit entities.
In 1944 the National Labor Relations Board asserted its juris-
diction in a dispute between a charitable hospital and the representa-
I National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1970), hereinafter referred to in text
as the Act.
5 The evolution of this test can be traced through a series of developmental stages. In the
Trustees of Columbia University, 97 N.L.R.B. 424, 29 L.R.R.M. 1098 (1951), the Board
confronted the question of jurisdiction over non-profit educational institutions.
It observed that the conference Report on the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947
had stated:
The . . . nonprofit organizations excluded under the subject to NLRB specifically
excluded in the conference agreement, for only in exceptional circumstances and in
connection with purely commercial activities of such organizations have any of the
activities of such organizations or of their employees been considered as affecting
commerce so as to bring them within the scope of the National Labor Relations Act.
In Cornell University, 183 N.L.R.B. 329, 74 L.R.R.M. 1269 (1970), the Board relied on the
Supreme Court's pronouncement in Office Employees International Union, Local No. 11 v.
NLRB, 353 U.S. 313, 318 (1957) that ". . the Board has never recognized such a blanket
rule of exclusion over all non-profit employers, It has declined jurisdiction on an ad hoc basis
over religious, educational, and eleemosynary employers. . . ." The Board ruled that educa-
tional institutions "as a class have not only a substantial, but massive impact on interstate
commerce," and subsequently jurisdiction was extended by Board rule-making to reach all non-
profit educational institutions. As a result of Cornell University, the impact on commerce of
the subject class of employers became the touchstone for the jurisdictional inquiry.
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tives of its employees in the case of NLRB v. Central Dispensary &
Emergency Hospital. The court of appeals determined that the activi-
ties of the hospital were "trade and commerce" within the meaning
of the National Labor Relations Act, and the fact that they were
carried on by a charitable hospital was deemed immaterial. In hold-
ing that a charitable hospital is not exempt from the National Labor
Relations Act, the court adopted the point of view of the employees:
"We cannot understand what considerations of public policy deprive
hospital employees of the privilege granted to employees of other
institutions." 6 This enduring policy enunciation, with an appeal of
logic that is practically oppressive in its simplicity and lucidity, was
the progenitor of the recent amendment.
In 1947 Congress enacted the Taft-Hartley Amendments to the
National Labor Relations Act. At this time, Congress apparently
determined that there were public policy considerations that made it
necessary to deprive employees of non-profit hospitals of the privi-
leges granted to employees of other institutions. In a bit of legislative
legerdemain, § 2(2) of the National Labor Relations Act was
amended to define the term "employer" so as not to include "any
corporation or association operating a hospital, if no part of a net
earnings inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individ-
ual." Unfortunately, the legislative history of this "exemption" fails
to indicate the policy considerations that support it and the intent of
Congress in enacting it.'
Due to the exemption in the National Labor Relations Act and
the absence of effective state legislation, employees of non-profit
hospitals have been denied the statutory right of collective bargain-
ing, and hospitals have been denied the protection of the provisions
of the National Labor Relations Act that are designed to ensure
quick and amicable resolution of disputes, with minimal interference
with the operation of the facility. The experience under the exemption
was that withholding the Board's jurisdiction did not reduce the num-
I NLRB v. Central Dispensary & Emergency Hospital, 145 F.2d 852, 853 (D.C. Cir.
1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 847 (1945). This particular reasoning was echoed in Council 19,
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 296
F. Supp. 1100 (N.D. I11. 1968).
7 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1970).
In spite of a lack bf clarity of the legislative history regarding the exemption of charitable
hospitals from National Labor Relations Board jurisdiction, the Draconian aftermath of the
exemption was clear. Such was exemplified in the decision in Utah Labor Relations Board v.
Utah Valley Hospital, 120 Utah 463, 235 P.2d 520 (1951). In that case the court indicated that
in the absence of preemption of the field by Congress, state law controlled labor-management
relations.
I H. R. REP. No. 1051, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1974).
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ber of strikes or labor unrest. To the contrary, with the rapid develop-
ment of the non-profit hospital industry, experience has shown an
increasing number of recognitional strikes.'
In response to this unsatisfactory state of affairs, the National
Labor Relations Board began asserting jurisdiction over areas it had
formerly ignored. It created the term "extended care facility" and
determined that such a facility was an "employer" subject to the
jurisdiction of the Board. 0 Narrowing the "exemption" could not
satisfactorily resolve the anomalies created by the lack of regulation
of the activities of non-profit hospitals, as the Board acted slowly and
cautiously." Instead, the confusion in this area called for the surgical
elimination of the exemption from the statute.
B. Impetus for Legislative Action
Congress approached the exclusion granted to non-profit hospi-
tals with the view that major disruptions in the medical industry had
resulted from strikes for recognition, made necessary by the fact that
an employer had no statutory duty to recognize a union representing
a majority of its employees in an appropriate unit.'2 By legislating
that employees in health care institutions would be covered by the
Act, it was contemplated that the incidence of strikes in the industry
would be greatly reduced. The amendment was described as having
the dual objectives of reducing recognitional strikes and lessening
employee turnover in health care institutions. 3 As a consequence of
H.R. REP. No. 1051, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1974).
20 NLRB v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Society, 477 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1973).
The Board accepted the American Hospital Association definition of "extended care facility,"
which is:
An establishment with permanent facilities that include inpatient beds: and with
medical services, including continuous nursing services, to provide treatment to pa-
tients who require inpatient care but do not require hospital services.
Drexel Home, Inc., 182 N.L.R.B. 1045, 1047, 74 L.R.R.M. 1232, 1235 (1970).
" E.g., jurisdiction was extended to proprietary hospitals whose annual gross revenues
exceeded $250,000 in Butte Medical Properties, 168 N.L.R.B. 266, 66 L.R.R.M. 1259 (1967)
and to profit-oriented nursing homes with an annual gross income of $100,000 or more in
University Nursing Home, Inc., 168 N.L.R.B. 263, 66 L.R.R.M. 1263 (1967). Most recently,
the Board extended its jurisdiction to cover non-profit nursing homes in Drexel Homes, Inc.,
182 N.L.R.B. 1045, 74 L.R.R.M. 1232 (1970), leaving only the non-profit hospital exempt
under the statutory language.
,2 Representatives from the Service Employees International Union testified before the
Senate Committee that recognition strikes accounted for approximately ninety-five percent of
all strikes in non-profit hospitals, averaging thirty-two days in length, and resulting in an
average of 3,967 idle man-days for each struck facility. 120 CONG. REV. 86932 (daily ed. May
2, 1974).
1 120 CONG. REC. 4587 (daily ed. May 30, 1974) (remarks of Rep. Thompson). Repre-
sentative Thompson cited the experience of Johns Hopkins Hospital in Baltimore, Maryland,
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the new law, it was hoped that labor-management relations in such
institutions would be focused on terms and conditions of employ-
ment, which were thought to be meaningful issues less associated with
conflict than issues pertaining to union recognition.14
The prevailing Congressional view was that the public interest
in continued and competent health care demands that employees of
health care institutions be treated in the same way as employees in
other industries. Moreover, disparate treatment for employees per-
forming identical functions in proprietary institutions and non-profit
nursing homes appeared illogical. Thus Congress disregarded the
prior classification of non-profit hospitals as "local" in nature and
having an insubstantial effect on commerce and focused instead on
their similarity to proprietary hospitals, differentiating them only in
their manner of distribution of revenues. After all, it is not an espe-
cially beguiling argument that the non-profit health care industry is
"local" or that it does not affect commerce since its employees num-
ber over one and a half million, or fifty-six percent of all health care
workers, and since non-profit hospitals realized a net total revenue
of nearly nineteen billion dollars in 1972.
Congressional oration also evinced the hope that the quality of
health care would improve as workers in the nation's health care
institutions received wage increases. Testimony was presented that
indicated that hospital wages had risen more slowly than the cost of
hospital care in the five-year period prior to 1973. It was reported
that in that time interval the wages of non-supervisory hospital em-
ployees increased 43.6%, while the Consumer Price Index of semi-
private hospital rates increased at a rate of 66.8%.'1 The Communica-
tion Workers of America estimated that the 1970 average annual
income for all hospital employees, including doctors, nurses, and
administrators, was only $5,290.16
regarding the high rate of employee turnover, which prompted that hospital to recognize
voluntarily a bargaining agent for its non-professional employees. The hospital had experienced
a 1200% annual employee turnover rate which dropped to less than thirty percent after the
union was recognized.
" 120 CONG. REC. 6933 (daily ed. May 2, 1974) (testimony of N. Metzger, Vice-President
for personnel, Mt. Sinai Medical Center, New York).
,1 120 CONG. REC. 6933 (daily ed. May 2, 1974) (testimony of J. Murphy, Representative
of Service Employees' International Union). The wage issue may bring some difficult problems
to the health care industry. Wages are depressed because the public and the institutions them-
selves have considered their activities as "quasi-charitable," many work forces are staffed by
volunteers, and much of the labor in such institutions orginates from the traditionally underpaid
sectors of the work force (i.e., women and minority groups). It does not appear that health
care institutions will be able to reverse this condition instantly, even spurred by the goad of
potentially crippling strikes.
1, These figures were supplemented by testimony that indicated that the average house
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The most facile method of eliminating the. inequities and incon-
sistencies created by the exemption would have been merely to excise
the section granting immunity, so that health care institutions would
enjoy the same status as all employers included within the purview
of the Act. However, Congress chose not simply to delete the exemp-
tion. Rather, it made an effort to fashion comprehensive legislation
that would accomodate the special public interest in continuous
health service to patients. While existing law adequately regulates the
interplay between management and labor generally, it was thought
to be inadequate to provide the protection necessary for uninter-
rupted patient care. As a result, the enacted legislation seeks to estab-
lish a mechanism which will afford essential rights to employees of
health care institutions while insuring that patient needs will not be
sacrificed.
In framing the new legislation, Congress considered (a) identifi-
cation of employers to be affected by the amendments, (b) strike and
picketing activity at health care institutions, (c) procedural standards
for bargaining with such employers, (d) accomodation of religious
beliefs, and (e) appropriate bargaining units in the health care indus-
try. The resulting legislation indicates that Congress clearly created
for the health care institution a unique status in the scheme of the
National Labor Relations Act.
II. AFFECTED EMPLOYERS
A. "Health Care Institutions"
The amendments define a "health care institution" as any:
. . . hospital, convalescent hospital, health maintenance organiza-
tion, health clinic, nursing home, extended care facility, or other
institution devoted to the care of the sick, infirm or aged person.
The definition thereby incorporates most obvious health-related
employees as well as the newly-created "health maintenance organi-
zations" 7 and "extended care facilities," a term which has generated
a particularized meaning throughout its once-important reign and
tenure.
staff employee (interns, residents, or fellows) worked an average of between seventy and one
hundred hours each week, earning a salary of approximately $10,000 per year, which amounts
to an hourly wage figure ranging between $1.92 and $2.74 per hour. 120 CONG. REc. S6933
(daily ed. May 2, 1974) (remarks of Sen. Cranston).
'1 An HMO is an organization that contracts, for a fixed fee, to provide basic medical
care to a body of participating members. It (1) provides "basic and supplemental health services
to its members" as set forth in the Health Maintenance Organization Act, and (2) is organized
and operated as the statute mandates.
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The new definition not only makes no distinction between profit
and non-profit organizations, but demonstrates a deliberate purpose
to leap all potential ambiguities and voids which would halt less
ambitious enactments. The legislative history of the amendment is
replete with recognition of the peculiar nature and status of the health
care industry. The inescapable conclusion is that Congress attempted
to differentiate the health-care industry from other employers, thus
portending accordingly distinctive treatment by the Board and the
courts.
It should be noted that the existing exemption for "the United
States or any wholly owned Government corporation or any Federal
Reserve Bank, or any State or political subdivision thereof ..."
remains unaffected by the legislation."8 Consequently, health care
institutions operated by municipal, state or federal governments will
still not be deemed "employers" within the Act.
An obvious question raised by the new statutory language deals
with the outer limits of the definition of a "health care institution."
The relevant legislative history indicates that not all entities generally
or remotely active in health-related fields are covered. The distinction
is drawn between "patient-care situations" and those services which
are "purely administrative health connected facilities." 9 By way of
example, the Congressional debates categorize insurance companies
such as Blue Cross and Blue Shield as "administrative or financial
organizations associated with health care institutions, ' 20 and not
11 S. REP. No. 766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1974); 120 CONG. REC. S7310 (daily ed. May
7, 1974) (remarks of Sen. Taft).
In Toledo District Nurse Association, 216 N.L.R.B. No. 130, 88 L.R.R.M. 1392 (1975),
the Board dismissed the Union's representation petition after having determined that the To-
ledo District Nurse Association and the City of Toledo were joint employers of the work force
the Union sought to represent. As a consequence, the Nurse Association shared the City's
statutory exemption from the Act. The majority also indicated that even if the two concerns
were not joint employers, the Board would exercise its discretionary power to decline
jurisdiction due to the intimate relationship between the City and the Nurse Association.
(Member Fanning, dissenting, would assert jurisdiction over the Association, regardless of its
interaction with the City, if the Association had retained sufficient control over the employment
conditions of its employees to enable it to bargain effectively with a union).
" 120 CONG. REc. 7310 (daily ed. May 7, 1974) (remarks of Sen. Taft).
" 120 CONG. REc. 4594 (daily ed. May 30, 1974) (remarks of Rep. Dellenback). Due to
the fact that Health Maintenance organizations, which are specifically included within the
definition of a "health care institution," are designed to be an alternative to existing medical
insurance plans, some question may arise as to the viability of the distinction raised in the
legislative history, which exempts organizations merely "associated" with health care institu-
tions.
However, it would appear that the distinction between medical insurance companies and
Health Maintenance organizations is valid. The Health Maintenance organization is involved
in a "patient-care situation," as distinguished from the third-party financial risk-bearing nature
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within the scope of the new definition (but still within the general
coverge of the Act), while the administrative departments of hospitals
and other covered employers would not be exempted, 21 due to their
"direct or indirect connection with ongoing patient care." Accord-
ingly, such other diverse peripheral services such as diet clinics, health
centers, gymnasiums, etc., whose trade deals primarily with weight
or body conditioning, as distinguished from "patient care functions,"
will not be included as "health care institutions. ' 22
Coverage depends on the perhaps illusory standard of "real pa-
tient care and health service delivery." Whether such service is pro-
vided in an outpatient or inpatient situation is not determinative.
Additionally, the legislative history indicates that the statutory term
of "sick, infirm, or aged" persons is not intended as a limiting clause,
as "specialty health services," such as those concerned with mental
retardation, will also be deemed covered employers under the Act.23
It would appear that the determinative factor in questions of
coverage is the existence of legitimfte professional care and the
connection (in both a theoretical and physical sense) between the
activities in question and actual patient care and welfare. Analysis in
terms of such an awkward concept certainly distinguishes services
Congress did not intend to cover (such as insurance groups and diet
parlors), but has not yet been refined to the point of providing a
reliable standard in the occasional hybird situation, such as
ambulance-rescue teams and paramedical services. It would appear
to be consonant with legislative intent, however, to resolve such ques-
tions in favor of coverage. The statutory definition is couched in
terms of considerable breadth and has significant potential for ad-
ministrative or judicial expansion.
B. Jurisdictional Standards
In determining affected employers, the issue of jurisdictional
standards arises. Although the Board is empowered to exercise juris-
diction over employers engaged in interstate commerce, it may dec-
line to do so on the basis that those interstate activities, when judged
against Board-established tests, will have such a minimal impact on
interstate commerce that expenditure of government resources to
resolve the dispute is not warranted. The power of the Board to
of medical insurance plans. In fact, many Health Maintenance organizations are being estab-
lished by insurance companies such as Blue Cross-Blue Shield.
21 120 CONG. REC. 7310 (daily ed. May 7, 1974) (remarks of Sen. Taft).
2 120 CONG. REc. 4594 (daily ed. May 30, 1974) (remarks of Rep. Thompson).
23 Id.
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establish jurisdictional standards is recognized by the Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act,24 which expressly pro-
vides that the Board may, by adjudication or published rule, decline
jurisdiction in situations where there is an insubstantial effect on
interstate commerce.
The Board's jurisdictional standards generally focus on the
amount of the employer's annual dollar volume of interstate business.
The limits apply to both representation and unfair labor practice
cases. However, the promulgated standards are not absolute bars to
Board jurisdiction: the Board may disregard or modify the estab-
lished limits where the effect of that action would be to broaden
jurisdiction.2 In addition to the jurisdictional standards, the Board
also has, by adjudication, declined jurisdiction over industries whose
operations are deemed "local" in character.26
In dealing with health care employers, the Board has asserted
jurisdiction over proprietary hospitals whose gross revenue exceeds
$250,000, and nursing homes whose gross revenues exceed $100,000.27
The Board has also asserted jurisdiction over physicians' group prac-
24 29 U.S.C. § 164(c) (1970).
25 As a result, the Board will exercise jurisdiction where an employer refuses to submit
requested commerce data, regardless of the extent of interstate business, Tropicana Products,
Inc., 122 N.L.R.B. 121, 43 L.R.R.M. 1077 (1958); or where a pattern of unlawful conduct has
an effect on employers both covered and excluded by the standard, so that an effective remedy,
reaching all incidents of the unlawful activity, may be fashioned. Euclid Foods, Inc., 118
N.L.R.B. 130,40 L.R.R.M. 1135 (1957).
21 However, in Bio-Medical Applications of San Diego, Inc., 216 N.L.R.B. No. 115,
(1975), the Board asserted jurisidction over an employer who operated a community unit that
provided life-maintenance hemodialysis treatments to outpatients. The employer argued that
its medical services were essentially local in character, and therefore the Board should not assert
jurisdiction, relying on the recent Board pronouncements in Alameda Medical Group, Inc., 195
N.L.R.B. 312, 79 L.R.R.M. 1314 (1972), and Cleveland Avenue Medical Center, 209 N.L.R.B.
No. 60, 85 L.R.R.M. 1401 (1974), where the Board declined to assert jurisdiction over similarly
specialized clinics dealing primarily with local patients. The Board found these cases no longer
controlling, in view of the health care amendments to the Act which extended jurisdiction to
all health care institutions which have a substantial impact on commerce, even though they may
be local in character. (In support of the decision, the Board noted that the employer's annual
gross income exceeded current dollar volume discretionary standards applied to hospitals,
nurses' associations, and retail enterprises. Additionally, the employer had a substantial inflow
of materials from outside the state, indicating that the impact of the employer's operations on
commerce was sufficient to warrant assertion of jurisdiction.)
27 Butte Medical Properties, 168 N.L.R.B. 266, 66 L.R.R.M. 1259 (1967). In Butte, the
hospital had annual gross revenues of over $1,000,000, fifty percent of which were derived from
national insurance concerns. The Board found that the nation's proprietary hospitals received
about $551,000,000 in revenue in 1965, which indicated a clearly substantial impact on com-
merce.
Jurisdiction over nursing homes was asserted in University Nursing Home, Inc., 168
N.L.R.B. 263, 66 L.R.R.M. 1263 (1967) (proprietary nursing home) and Drexel Homes, Inc.,
182 N.L.R.B. 1045, 74 L.R.R.M. 1232 (1970) (non-profit nursing home).
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tices. Under existing practice, employees in these generic categories,
whose dollar value meets the applicable standard, will be deemed to
"affect commerce" in a manner substantial enough to warrant asser-
tion of NLRB jurisdiction.
Congress was acutely aware of the presence of such standards
in NLRB practice. Senator Taft expressed the desire that "the
[B]oard would continue to apply reasonable monetary standards,"
giving explicit approval to the existing standards developed by the
Board. 2 The opposite view was represented by Senator Williams who
would read the statutory language as being mandatory in its all-
inclusive nature.29
Existing jurisdictional standards present a solitary sentinel
guarding against what some fear is an inexorable march to coverage
of non-profit hospitals under the Act. NLRB General Counsel Peter
Nash, in issuing guidelines directed to Regional Directors, has taken
the position that until the Board rules to the contrary, the NLRB
Regional Offices will operate under the applicable discretionary stan-
dards currently utilized for covered institutions.3 Some support for
this position is drawn from prior Board practice concerning use of
gross revenue standards when dealing with proprietary health institu-
tions.31
Moreover, the health care employer, in recognition of its special
status, was afforded unique protective measures in the amendments
so that it should not be more susceptible to NLRB coverage than its
previously covered brethren. Indeed, to assert jurisdiction over em-
ployers in the health care field whose revenues do not approach those
demanded for other employers would be to engage in a myopic read-
ing of the history of NLRB activity in this field, existing precedent,
2 Senator Taft not only supported the current standards of $250,000 annual volume of
business (for proprietary hospitals) and $100,000 annual volume of business (for proprietary
nursing homes), but hinted that perhaps higher levels should be established, in light of current
inflationary trends. 120 CONG. REC. 3710 (daily ed. May 7, 1974).
21 120 CONG. REC. 12104 (daily ed. July 10, 1974). Representatives Ashbrook and Thomp-
son issued a joint statement to the House of Representatives in which they generally agreed
with the sentiments expressed by Senator Williams in his remarks to the Senate. However, they
disagreed on the question of the impact of jurisdictional standards: they stated that the House
Education and Labor Committee was "fully aware" of existing monetary standards, and that
the Committee had no intention to disturb the existing standards or impinge upon the Board's
discretionary powrs in that regard. 120 CONG. REc. 4849 (daily ed. July 18, 1974) (remarks of
Rep. Ashbrook).
3 N.L.R.B. General Counsel Memorandum 74-49 (Aug. 20, 1974) [4 CCH LAB. L. REP.
9046 (1974) (Hereinafter N.L.R.B. General Counsel).
"1 See, e.g., Cleveland Avenue Medical Center, 209 N.L.R.B. No. 60, 85 L.R.R.M. 1401
(1974); Visiting Nursing Association, Inc., 188 N.L.R.B. 155, 76 L.R.R.M. 1271 (1971); The
Swanholm, 186 N.L.R.B. 45, 75 L.R.R.M. 1282 (1970).
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the doctrinal value of the amendment's evolution, and the spirit of
the legislative concern in this area. To date, no Board decisions have
set forth which jurisdictional standards, if any, should be applied to
the private, non-profit hospital employers.
3 2
III. STRIKES AND PICKETING AT HEALTH CARE INSTITUTIONS
A. Notice Requirements
The amendments to the Act provide that a health care institution
must be given a ten day advance notice by a labor organization before
any picketing or strike (whether or not related to bargaining) can
lawfully occur.? The notice provision was formulated in an effort
2 The Board, when asserting jurisdiction based on current discretionary jurisdictional
standards, has left the determination of the precise monetary standards to be applied in the
case of non-profit hospitals to subsequent adjudication pursuant to §§ 102 and 103 of the Board
Rules and Regulations. Marquette General Hospital, 216 N.L.R.B. No. 44, 88 L.R.R.M. 1178
(1975); Bio-Medical Applications of San Diego, Inc., 216 N.L.R.B. No. 115 (1975). In Phila-
delphia College of Osteopathic Medicine, 213 N.L.R.B. No. 44, 87 L.R.R.M. 1182 (1974), the
Board asserted jurisdiction over a private non-profit corporation on the basis that the annual
gross revenue from the medical school it operated exceeded the one million dollar jurisdictional
standard set for private, non-profit colleges and universities. Members Miller, Jenkins and
Kennedy expressly declined to decide the question of what standards should be applied to
private non-profit hospitals alone. Similarly, the Board declined, in Yale-New Haven Hospital,
214 N.L.R.B. No. 34, 87 L.R.R.M. 1271 (1974), to make a determination of the precise
monetary standards to be applied to non-profit hospitals, finding that the employer in question
had an annual gross revenue of $60 million, which was sufficient to meet any existing standard.
In Waterloo Surgical & Medical Group, 213 N.L.R.B. No. 61, 87 L.R.R.M. 1136 (1974),
the employer contended that a partnership of medical practitioners and surgeons (whose gross
volume of business was approximately 1.4 million dollars and whose gross receipts were approx-
imately 1.3 million dollars) should not be subject to NLRB jurisdiction because the practice
was essentially local in character and the impact on commerce was not substantial enough.
After reviewing the gross volume of business and gross receipts figures, the Board cited the
following facts of evidence of a substantial impact on interstate commerce: (a) purchases from
outside the state totalled over $33,000, (b) the clinic treated 8,245 patients, including ninety-
seven from out of state (who provided nearly $5,000 in revenues), (c) the doctors functioned as
examining physicians for the Illinois Central Railroad, Rath Packing Co., and other industrial
and service companies, (d) two of the doctors were certified by the Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration, and (e) the group received substantial income from insurance companies, federal agen-
cies, and public welfare agencies. Member Kennedy, while agreeing with the decision, reserved
judgment as to whether the Board should assert jurisdiction over medical practitioners or clinics
of "a more limited nature," as he did not interpret the amendments to the Act as requiring
assertion of jurisdiction over local neighborhood doctors or clinics.
3 Newly created § 8(g) provides:
A labor organization before engaging in any strike, picketing, or other concerted
refusal to work at any health care institution shall, not less than ten days prior to
such action, notify the institution in writing and the Federal Mediation and Concilia-
tion Service of that intention, except that in the case of bargaining for an initial
agreement following certification or recognition, the notice required by this subsec-
tion shall not be given until the expiration of the period specified in clause (B) of
the last sentence of Section 8(d) of this Act. The notice shall state the date and time
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to protect the public interest in the continuity of general health care
and the welfare of patients as the ten day notice is intended to give
affected employers sufficient notice of anticipated strike or picketing
activity to enable them to make adequate arrangements for continued
patient care. A second purpose of the ten day notice period is to give
the Board an opportunity, if charges are filed after the notice is
received, to determine the legality of the strike or picketing before it
has a perhaps avoidable and unjustified detrimental effect on the
health care institution.
Although failure to give the required notice will be an unfair
labor practice,3 neither the statute nor the legislative debates deline-
ate pertinent details, such as who should receive the notice, the mode
of transmittal, how the ten-day period should be calculated, or the
required scope and specificity of the notice.
In the guidelines issued to the Regional Office, the NLRB Gen-
eral Counsel administratively supplied the following answers:35
(a) the 8(g) notice should be served on someone who has been
designated to receive the notice or through whom the institution will
actually be notified;
(b) the notice should be personally delivered or sent by mail or by
mail or by' telegram;
(c) the ten-day period begins upon receipt of the notice by the
employer and Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service [FMCS];
(d) the notice should specify the dates and times of both strike and
picket conduct, if both are contemplated; 3 and
(e) the notice should also indicate which unit(s) will be involved
in the planned action.
that such action will commence. The notice, once given, may be extended by the
written agreement of both parties.
3 120 CONG. REC. 7310 (daily ed. May 7, 1974) (remarks of Sen. Taft).
31 N.L.R.B. General Counsel, supra note 30, at 15,221-22.
u Although the § 8(g) notice must be specific, the General Counsel has refused to issue a
complaint where the union's notice did not explicitly mention that picketing would occur in
addition to the noticed strike activity. The union's notices stated that the "strike" was to protest
the employer's unfair labor practices, and thereafter, the union began picketing simultaneously
with the strike. Under these cricumstances, the notice was considered to indicate that the
strikers would also picket. General Counsel Monthly Report on Health Care Institution Cases,
First Report, Section III, 88 L.R.R. 10 (1975). This view seems to be somewhat inconsistent
with the General Counsel's opinion that separate notices were demanded when two unions
picketed a health care institution together. In view of the statutory intent to allow for prepara-
tions to insure effective patient care (which justified the necessity of notices from each union),
it is suggested that specific notice of anticipated picketing activity should be demanded, in
addition to the strike warning. Such notice may be necessary to allow the health care institution
to arrange for insured availability and/or continued delivery of life-preserving supplies through
picket lines, where such preparation might not be undertaken if it were anticipated that the
strike alone would not curtail the deliveries.
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The scope of the statutory notice requirement is anticipated to
be expansive. For example, the General Counsel has authorized the
issuance of a § 8(g) complaint where a union, without serving the
required notices on FMCS and the employer, directed some off-duty
employees to engage in a two-hour demonstration picket at a health
care insitution. Notwithstanding the facts that no deliveries or serv-
ices were interrupted and the union's activity was of short duration,
it was concluded that the picketing fell within the literal proscription
of § 8(g).17 Similarly, where an employer has multiple facilities, the
General Counsel is of the opinion that a proper notice requires that
the union specifically mention which particular facilities are to be the
subjects of the anticipated strike, pickets, or concerted refusals to
work ."
This is a logical counterpart to the conclusion that all separate
employers, regardless of the commonality of the labor dispute, are
entitled to separate and individual 8(g) notices .3  It is also in accord
with the legislative intent to give health care institutions advance
notice so that continued patient care will be assured at the institution,
especially if the labor dispute does not concern employees of the
affected institution. Even though the literal language of the statute
calling for notices to be given to "the institution" would arguably be
satisfied by tendering notice to the main office of a multiple facility
employer, the intent of the statute is best served by an expansive,
rather than a narrow, reading of the notice requirements.
The General Counsel has also authorized the issuance of a com-
plaint where a union, without serving a separate notice, engaged in
one and one-half hours of picketing activity at a health care institu-
tion with off-duty employees (thereby negating any possibility of a
work stoppage), where the activity was only to lend support to an-
other labor organization which had properly followed the 8(g) notice
1 General Counsel Monthly Report on Health Care Institution Cases, First Report,
Section I, 88 L.R.R. 8 (1975).
In another case, picketing by a construction union to protest the presence of a non-union
plumbing company at a construction project on the premises of an operative health care
institution, although it was not directed at any of the hospital's employees and caused no
interruptions of deliveries to the hospital or work stoppages by the hospital employees, was held
to be within the § 8(g) proscription of picketing "at any health care institution" without proper
notice to the hospital. In the General Counsel's view, the picketing represented a potential
inducement to employees of both the hospital and its suppliers to engage in work stoppages,
which could have a disruptive and debilitating effect on effective patient care. General Counsel
Monthly Report on Health Care Institution Cases, First Report, Section II, 88 L.R.R. 9
(1975).
11 General Counsel Monthly Report on Health Care Institution Cases, Third Report,
Section IV, 88 L.R.R. 182 (1975).
" See notes 84-87 infra and accompanying text.
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and waiting procedures. In the General Counsel's view, the assisting
union could not be relieved of its obligation to serve its own notices
prior to engaging in its sympathetic activity. The stated rationale for
this decision was that there is nothing in the legislative history of the
amendments to suggest that a union may rely on another's notice,
and "preparations made necessary in response to impending eco-
nomic pressure by the second union may be quite different from, and
in excess of, those necessitated by the threatened activity of the first
union." 0
B. Unfair Labor Practices Under Section 8(g)
The Congressional intent is that violation of the 8(g) notice re-
quirement will constitute an unfair labor practice separate and dis-
tinct from those presently existing. The extent of the violation, how-
ever, was again a point of contention between Senators Taft and
Williams.
As in the case in the jurisdictional standard question, it appears
that General Counsel Nash substantially agrees with Senator Taft.
Thus violations of the notice provision will likely result in 8(b)(3)
failures to bargain in good faith, in addition to 8(g) transgressions.4'
In keeping with the imprecise language of the statute, the Senate
and House Reports state that the paramount objective of the notice
requirement is to allow for arrangement of "continuity of patient
care." In this context, the House and Senate Committees stated that
while a hygenic regard for timing is not mandated, it would be unrea-
sonable for strike or picket activity to begin more than seventy-two
hours after the time set forth in the tendered notice. Also, pursuant
to the notice objective, if the union does not in fact begin such activity
when specified in the notice, at least twelve hours additional notice
must be given prior to the actual commencement of the activity. 2 If,
10 General Counsel Monthly Report on Health Care Institution Cases, Third Report,
Section V, 88 L.R.R. 184 (1975). The fact that no 8(d) loss of employee status was thought to
have resulted from this activity underscores the reliance on the dichotomy appearing in the
statutory language where § 8(g) extends to "picketing, striking, or other concerted refusal to
work at any health care institution. . . ." while § 8(d) provides for loss of employee status
where an employee engages in "a strike within any notice period" specified in § 8(d) or "any
strike within the appropriate period specified in subsection (g) of this section" (emphasis
added).
"t Senator Taft thinks that violation of the notice requirements, applicable to "any picket
or strike," will constitute an independent unfair labor practice, a refusal to bargain under §
8(b)(3), as well as an unfair labor practice under any other relevant existing sections of the Act.
120 CONG. REc. 6941 (daily ed. May 2, 1974). Senator Williams responded that if an 8(g)
violation was intended also to be a refusal to bargain, it would have been explicitly declared as
such. 120 CONG. REC. 12104 (daily ed. July 10, 1974).
42 S. REP. No. 766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1974); H.R. REP. No. 1051, 93d Cong. 2d Sess.
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conversely, the strike or picket is to occur outside the seventy-two
hour time period, a new ten day notice must be offered.
If a strike is called and then abandoned, the general rule should
be that a new notice must be given to the employer before the activity
is recommenced. Once picketing or a strike has been lawfully comm-
enced, it is not necessary that the union maintain the activity continu-
ously to void the necessity of service repeated notices on the em-
ployer. In this regard, if the facts and circumstances of the
discontinued strike lead to the reasonable conclusion that the activity
may be renewed, no new notice will be required if the activity is
recommenced within seventy-two hours of the beginning of the period
of inactivity. However, if the reasonably anticipated renewal occurs
beyond the seventy-two hour period, the union will be required to give
the employer twelve hours advance notice. Conversely, if it is reason-
able to think that the strike or picketing activity has ceased, the union
will be required to give twelve hours notice if the activity is to resume
within seventy-two hours of the start of the interim period of inaction.
Further, a new ten day notice will be necessary if the strike or picket-
ing is resumed more than seventy-two hours after the time that it was
initially discontinued.
Regulatory measures designed to fit the particular nature of the
health care situation surface in consideration of specific timing of
strike and picketing activity. For example, violations of the guidelines
set forth above would presumably amount to unfair labor practices.
Harrassement of an employer by the repeated transmittal of ten-
day notices will be deemed a refusal to bargain in good faith. Also,
sporadic and intermittent strikes and/or picketing activity become a
realistic potential abuse of the new legislation. While there is author-
ity that such intermittent activity is not necessarily an 8(b)(3) viola-
tion,"3 the special nature and need for continuous health care services
may dictate that such activity, even subsequent to repeated notices,
will be considered a failure to bargain in good faith."
It will be noted that the language of § 8(g) deals with "any"
picketing, strikes, etc. The legislative history indicates:
This subsection applies not only to bargaining strikes or pickets, but
also. . . . [a]s examples,. . . to recognition strikes, area standard
strikes, secondary strikes, jurisdictional strikes, and the like. 5
5 (1974).
NLRB v. Insurance Agents Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
" S. REP. No. 766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1974). Exactly when sporadic activity will be
deemed "intermittent," and therefore bad faith bargaining, must necessarily await administra-
tive or judicial exegesis.
11 120 CONG. Rac. 6941 (daily ed. May 2, 1974) (remarks of Sen. Taft).
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Accordingly, the NLRB guidelines state:
• . . it would appear that a health care institution would have to
receive ten days' written notice before being struck or picketed,
whether the institution is subjected to primary, secondary, recogni-
tional, area standards, or sympathetic strike or picketing activity.
The 8(g) notice requirements would probably also apply if a health
care institution becomes so enmeshed in a dispute as to become an
'ally' of a struck employer (whether or not that employer be a health
care institution or an 'employer' as that term is customarily used)."
By its express terms, § 8(g) applies only to "labor organiza-
tions." Consequently, activities of employers are not prohibited by
the section (for example, lockouts). Similarly, the express language
refers to "strikes," "picketing," or "concerted refusals to work" at
health care institutions; therefore, other union activity unconnected
to such enumerated specifics, such as handbilling,47 should not be
encompassed in the notice requirement section.
C. Instances Where Section 8(g) Notices May Be Unnecessary
The legislative debates enumerated at least two situations in
which it was felt that the interests of the affected employees would
override the notice requirements of § 8(g).
1. Employer Unfair Labor Practices
The first situation parallels and virtually enshrines the standing
precedental authority of Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB.5 In that
case, the United States Supreme Court considered charges brought
where an employer discharged an employee for union activities,
which resulted in a protest strike by other employees. The Court held
that the notice period of § 8(d) did not apply to strikes that protest
unfair labor practices, in the absence of any attempt to change the
terms of the existing contract. The Court, through Mr. Justice Bur-
ton, reasoned that the notice provision was not included in the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, and should not be interpreted, to allow
employers to have a period in which they are insulated from retalia-
tory strikes where unfair labor practices have been committed. There-
fore, the time limits set out in § 8(d) apply to economic strikes (those
" N.L.R.B. General Counsel, supra note 30, at 15,228.
'T See Hamilton Materials, Inc., 144 N.L.R.B. 1523, 54 L.R.R.M. 1283 (1963), where the
Board indicated that explanatory circulars may constitute a threat or be intended to induce
work stoppage, in violation of § 8(b)(4).
" Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956).
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to terminate or modify a contract), rather than those in protest of
flagrant or serious unfair labor practices.
The weight of the comments indicate that a "serious" or "fla-
grant" unfair labor practice must be committed by the health care
institution before the union's failure to give advance notice of picket-
ing or strike activity will be overlooked. The legislative history indi-
cates that the notice requirement will be excused only in "very limited
situations," where an employer's unfair labor practice is so aggra-
vated that a no-strike clause will be rendered unenforceable or inef-
fectual. The suggestion that the exception should be confined to un-
fair labor practices of the magnitude of those encountered in Mastro
Plastics is underscored by the explicit reference in the Committee
Reports to that decision, for example, Senator Taft's quote from
Mastro Plastics that the exception applies "only where the actions of
the employer 'reflect a flagrant example of interference by employers
with an expressly protected right of their employees to select their
own bargaining representative.' ""
41 120 CONG. REC. 7310 (daily ed. May 7, 1974). This view is also supported by the
comments of Representative Ashbrook. 120 CONG. REc. 4849 (daily ed. July 18, 1974). Senator
Williams would not so restrict the instances where the notice is not required but would rather
interpret the word "flagrant" to distinguish those cases where an employer was guilty of merely
a "technical" violation of the Act from the myriad of cases where § 7 rights are interfered with
by the employer. 120 CONG. REC. 12104 (daily ed. July 10, 1974).
The General Counsel has had some occasion to define the .parameters of a "flagrant" or
"serious" unfair labor practice, and has indicated that an employer's refusal to bargain based
upon a challenge to the certification of the union was not a "flagrant" or "serious" unfair labor
practice that would excuse the failure to comply with the requirements of § 8(g). General
Counsel Monthly Report on Health Care Institution Cases, First Report, Section III, 88
L.R.R. 11 (1975).
Conversely, the General Counsel has refused to issue a § 8(g) complaint notwithstanding
the fact that no notices were served, based upon an employer's "flagrant" unfair labor practices.
The General Counsel concluded that the union's picketing was intended to protest the em-
ployer's course of serious § 8(a)(l) and (3) conduct which substantially impaired the employees'
exercise of their statutory rights. In this instance, the employer's conduct included "the dis-
charge of approximately nine employees, including all the leading Union adherents and sympa-
thizers; threats of discharge or reduction in pay if the employees engaged in activity in support
of the Union; interrogation of employees about their Union activities and the Union activities
of their fellow employees; granting employees wage increases to discourage them from engaging
in Union activity; surveillance and creating the impression of surveillance of Union activity;
discriminatory enforcement of a previously unused personnel manual as a reprisal for the
employees Union activities; and discriminatory transfer or threats to transfer leading Union
adherents." As a result of this conduct, proceedings under § 8(g) were felt to be unwarranted,
in spite of the fact that the union began its picketing activity three days prior to the time
indicated in the notice which was served on the employer. The fact that the union was not an
incumbent bargaining representative did not prevent application of the "flagrant unfair labor
practice" excuse for failure to tender the required notice. General Counsel Monthly Report on
Health Care Institution Cases, Second Report, Section III, 88 L.R.R. 103 (1975).
Where an employer's unfair labor practices are flagrant or serious enought to excuse the
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Existing decisional pronouncements can be read to excuse re-
quired strike notices only in cases where a "willful and serious viola-
tion of the law designed to destroy the very foundation of the contract
and the relationships [between the parties]"5 has occurred or where
an unfair labor practice is "destructive of the foundation upon which
collective bargaining must rest."5 In view of this development of the
Mastro Plastics doctrine and the overriding legislative intent to pro-
tect the public interest inherent in the continuity of health services,
the Board should excuse the failure to tender § 8(g) strike or picket
notices only in limited and exceptional circumstances.
2. Abuse of the Waiting Period
The second contemplated circumstance where failure to give no-
tice prior to strikes or picketing will be excused in perhaps even less
susceptible of precise identification than the Mastro Plastics
situation. The Committee Reports framed the concern in the follow-
ing manner:
Moreover, it is the sense of the Committee that during the ten-day
notice period the employer should remain free to take whatever
action is necessary to maintain health care, but not to use the ten-
day period to undermine the bargaining relationship that would
otherwise exist. For example, the employer would not be free to
bring in large numbers of supervisory help, nurses, staff and other
personnel from other facilities for replacement purposes. It would
clearly be free to receive supplies, but it would not be free to take
extraordinary steps to stock up on ordinary supplies for an unduly
extended period. While not necessarily a violation of the Act, viola-
tion of these principles would serve to release the labor organization
from its obligation not to engage in economic action during the
course of the ten-day notice period. 2
requirements set forth in Section 8(g), they may also be so pervasive as to warrant a bargaining
order without an election. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Company, 395 U.S. 575 (1969). In such
an event, the extent of any unlawful conduct on the part of the union must be investigated in
order to determine the appropriateness of the bargaining order. See, e.g., Lock Joint Pipe &
Co., 202 N.L.R.B. 399, 82 L.R.R.M. 1525 (1973), where the Board reiterated the "established
practice" that picket line misconduct and violence may negate the issuance of an otherwise
appropriate bargaining order. In this context, the General Counsel has indicated that where a
union pickets in violation of § 8(g), but where such picketing only lasts a short time and does
not disrupt the operations of the health care institution, the bargaining order will nevertheless
be deemed appropriate. General Counsel Monthly Report on Health Care Institution Cases,
Second Report, Section III, 88 L.R.R. 108 (1975).
10 Mastro Plastics Corp., 102 N.L.R.B. 511, 513, 31 L.R.R.M. 1494, 1495 (1953).
" Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 281 (1956).
52 S. REP. No. 766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1974); H.R. RaP. No. 1051, 93d Cong., 2d
HEALTH CARE INSTITUTIONS
The ten-day notice period was instituted because Congress felt
that it is in the public interest to insure continuous health care to the
community and protection to patient services by providing for ad-
vance notification of anticipated strike or picketing at a health care
institution. The special consideration of notice, unique to the health
care industry, was designed to allow the employer to make "appropri-
ate arrangements" for ongoing patient care in the event of a work
stoppage.
For non-health care related employers, who have no statutory
notice protection, it is not difficult to predict whether a strike will
occur at the end of the contract or negotiating period. When ap-
proaching the strike the employer will assess the company's ability
to survive a strike, the length of time that the strike can be endured,
what union demands may be accepted, the union position of favor or
disfavor with the employees, the employees' ability to endure a strike,
and the probabilities that other unions will honor the inevitable picket
lines. The health care institution must consider these questions as well
as the paramount concern that life and health maintenance services
will not be jeopardized. While the manufacturing or industrial em-
ployer considers how long he can endure employee inactivity, in an
economic sense, the health care employer must consider how basic
operations may be continued in the face of the strike. When the strike
appears imminent, the employer must decide if non-striking person-
nel are to be laid off, whether work may be transferred to other
affiliated plants, and whether non-union employees or permanent
replacements will be hired to continue operations. 53
Sess. 6 (1974). Under present authority, actions that "undermine the bargaining relationship
are possibly violations of §§ 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3), which deal respectively with interference and
discrimination. The special nature of the health care industry, then, does not isolate it from
what are felt to be unfair protective measures, and such acts presumably should be scrutinized
in terms of existing case law, with a corresponding inquiry into the motiviation behind the
employer's acts. See, e.g., NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967); NLRB v.
Brown, 380 U.S. 278 (1965); American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965). See
also Oberer, The Scienter Factor in Sections 8(a)l) and (3) of the Labor Act, 52 CORNELL
L.Q. 491 (1967).
The Committee Reports stated that Congress was aware that work stoppages in particular
hospitals, especially those in rural areas, might have a heightened effect on patient care. The
Committee expressed the hope that the parties in such a situation would be "cognizant of such
special problems and take steps, either in advance of any dispute, or during its resolution, to
mitigate the effects of a scarcity of alternative local resources." S. REP. No. 766, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. 5 (1974); H.R. REP. No. 1051, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1974). In light of this specific
Congressional recognition of potential hardships and possible serious disruptions to health care
in certain institutions, those employers may be afforded greater leeway in making advance
preparation, in the interest of continued patient care, for strike activity.
' Section 2(3) of the Act provides that a striking worker retains his status as an "em-
ployee." Whether the employee has a right to retain his job at the termination of the strike,
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Naturally, the health care employer will consider all of these
issues so that appropriate action can be undertaken when the threat-
ened strike or picketing activity eventually occurs. The statutory
mandate that the existing bargaining relationship must be preserved
extends by its terms only to the ten-day hiatus period, and thereafter
the health care institution will be permitted to exercise the options
and prerogatives available to other employers. These options neces-
sarily include the right to replace striking employees with permanent
workers.54
The health care institution receives advance notice so that it may
take whatever action is necessary to protect the continuity of patient
care and health services, but it is denied the opportunity to use the
notice period to prepare in such a way that would "undermine the
bargaining relationship that would otherwise exist." The object of
union economic activity is to interrupt the normal operations of the
employer, both by withholding their own labor and appealing to
sympathetic workers to do likewise, so that the employer will accede
to their demands. In this sense, any activity which allows the em-
ployer to continue operations necessarily impairs the effectiveness of
the union action. In determining whether acts taken by the employer
undermine the bargaining relationship involves a process of balancing
the rights and acts of the employer against those of the union and
analyzing the effect of the employer's activity or inactivity on the
public, rather than on the union.
For example, the Committee Reports state that although an
employer may be able to receive supplies, he may not take "extraor-
dinary" steps to stockpile supplies. An employer will have no diffi-
culty procuring supplies before the strike occurs. However, it may be
a reasonable desire, solely in the interest of maintaining patient care,
to begin to accumulate necessary supplies if the employer knows that
however, depends on the nature of the strike. An employee engaged in a strike undertaken in
response to unfair labor practices committed by the employer is entitled to be reinstated to his
former position, even if the employer has hired permanent replacements. NLRB v. MacKay
Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938). Conversely, where an economic strike occurs
(usually as an attempt to make an employer accede to the union bargaining demands), the
employer may decline to reinstate a striker if he has been permanently replaced by the time
the strike terminates. Id. However, an employee may not be summarily discharged for engaging
in an economic strike, as such activity is protected under § 7 of the Act. NLRB v. United States
Cold Storage Corp., 203 F.2d 924 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 818 (1953). If the employer
has not permanently replaced the striker, he has an obligation to reinstate him upon the receipt
of an unconditional request for re-employment. NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., Inc., 389 U.S.
375 (1967).
" See NLRB v. MacKay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938); The Laidlaw
Corp., 171 N.L.R.B. 1366, 68 L.R.R.M. 1252 (1968), enfd, 414 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970).
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his suppliers employ union delivery labor who will not cross the
picket line that will surely appear at the end of the ten-day waiting
period. In a similar vein, while an employer should not be allowed
to discharge union members expected to participate in the strike, it
may be a justifiable response, again in the interest of patient care, to
insure that skilled and qualified personnel will be available and ready
to replace striking employees. (This may become especially impor-
tant if other health care employers will be reluctant to provide neces-
sary replacements for fear that they will be termed an "ally" of the
struck employer, and therefore vulnerable to picketing activity at
their premises.)
The resolution of this paradox, involving what may appear to be
mutually exclusive policy declarations by Congress, will be attempted
through the proverbial "balancing process." General Counsel Nash
has stated:
The answers to such cases depend on what Congress thought, in a
broad sense, to be the balance it was striking. Quite clearly on the
one hand, Congress intended that a health care institution was to
have a ten-day period in which to arrange its affairs so that the lives
and health of its patients would not be jeopardized by union eco-
nomic action. The balance on the other hand depends upon what
Congress meant by the words 'undermine the bargaining relation-
ship that would otherwise exist.' Clearly, where an employer's ac-
tion is such as might destroy the union's representative status (e.g.,
hiring permanent replacements during the ten days for all union
members), it would seem that immediate union action would be
privileged.55
General Counsel Nash interprets the Congressional comments to
posit the test that where the employer's acts exceed what is essential
to the "health and life maintenance" of the patients, and instead
reinforce the employer's ability to endure the economic pressure ap-
plied by the union, the ten day notice requirement is vitiated.
"[R]elevant circumstances" that would determine whether ac-
tions were taken in order to bolster the employer's ability to take the
strike would be "the number of replacements being interviewed
and/or hired, the permanency of the replacements, the number and
type of supplies being ordered, the nature of the patients' illnesses,
and the willingness of the union to permit the passage of supplies and
personnel through its picket lines.""6 Listing these factors is an at-
tempt to provide an objective test for a policy question focusing on
" N.L.R.B. General Counsel, supra note 30, at 15,231.
5Id.
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subjective results.
When the employer's activities are deemed to undermine the
bargaining relationship, the union will be released from the notice
provisions set out in the new amendments. Board inquiry into these
activities will become frequent, not only to examine the defense to
8(g) charges brought by the employer, 57 but also to investigate before
the Board issues injunctive relief to halt union activities taken without
the requisite statutory notice.
D. Impact on Employees
1. Independent Employee Acts
In order for concerted employee actions to be protected by § 7
of the Act, it is not necessary that a formal organization be involved,
or, if the employees are represented, that the representative approve
or direct the employees' acts." Employees are generally protected if
their acts are designed to further the interests of a group of workers,
and not merely to benefit a particular individual, as such acts will be
considered "concerted activities for the purpose of. . . mutual aid
or protection" under § 7 of the Act. 9 Such concerted activities nor-
mally must pursue available grievance procedures to be protected
actions," but often group action will be sanctioned where no griev-
ance procedure is available6" or where extraordinary facts exist. 2
51 In this regard, it may be necessary for the Board to develop standards to insure that
the labor organization was actually aware of the acts taken by the employer in derogation of
the bargaining relationship, before the notice requirement is retroactively excused.
11 NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962). In the Washington Aluminum
decision, the Supreme Court held that a walkout by unrepresented employees, where the
temperature in the plant was only eleven degrees, was a "labor dispute" within § 2(9) of the
Act and that the walkout was concerted activity for mutual aid and protection within the
meaning of § 7. Discharge of striking employees therefore violated § 8(a)(l) of the Act. See
also NLRB v. Plastilite Corp., 375 F.2d 343 (8th Cir. 1967); NLRB v. Maydale Products Co.,
311 F.2d 890 (5th Cir. 1963). Cf NLRB v. Texas Natural Gasoline Corp., 253 F.2d 322 (5th
Cir. 1958).
s Pacific Electricord Co. v. NLRB, 361 F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1966).
o Farmers Union Cooperative Marketing Ass'n., 145 N.L.R.B. 1, 54 L.R.R.M. 1298
(1963).
61 NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962).
12 Knight Morley Corp., 116 N.L.R.B. 140, 38 L.R.R.M. 1194 (1956), enf'd, 251 F.2d
753 (6th Cir. 1957).
Concerted activity, whether in support of grievances or as a means of bringing economic
pressure to support employee negotiations, is protected conduct unless it is found to be beyond
the bounds of legitimate protest, such as set forth in the Fansteel decision. NLRB v. Fansteel
Metallurgical Corporation, 306 U.S. 240 (1939); Masonic Eastern Star Home, 206 N.L.R.B.
No. 127, 84 L.R.R.M. 1353 (1973). Accordingly, the General Counsel has authorized the
issuance of a § 8(a)(1) complaint where employees were discharged when they attempted, as a
group, to discuss working conditions with their employer beyond their break period, even
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Strike activity may be unlawful if it has an unlawful purpose63
or if it employs unlawful means to accomplish a lawful object. 4 For
example, failure to give notices required under § 8(d)" or contraven-
tion of a valid no-strike clause in the bargaining agreement may
render strikes illegal. If strike activity is deemed unlawful, it is then
unprotected activity.
The time notices set forth in § 8(g) of the new legislation apply
only to labor organizations. However, in considering strike or picket-
ing activity by employees who either act without the authority of their
union or belong to no union, Senator Taft remarked that such em-
ployees would have "no greater rights or fewer obligations," in the
context of § 8(g), than labor organizations. Consequently, employees
are required to give the required ten-day notice to the health care
institution before engaging in strike or picketing activity." The conse-
quence of the failure to give the required notice, while not a technical
violation of § 8(g), is that the actions of the employees would be
deemed "unprotected," and the employer would be free to discharge
them or take disciplinary measures.6"
though they failed to comply with the notice requirements of § 8(g) prior to the action. The
employer had disciplined the employees on the ground that they were engaging in a "work
stoppage" under the Act. The General Counsel reasoned that the actions would constitute
protected activity unless the employees were deemed to be engaged in a "strike or concerted
refusal to work" without having served the § 8(g) notices. In this particular instance, no work
stoppage within the meaning of § 8(g) was found, but the clear implication of the General
Counsel's decision is that employees may be discharged or disciplined where they engage in
what is found to be a work stoppage where the necessary statutory notices are not served.
General Counsel Monthly Report on Health Care Institution Cases, Third Report, Section III,
88 L.R.R. 181 (1975).
13 Unlawful purposes include striking for an illegal objective, NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co.,
306 U.S. 332 (1939); jurisdictional strikes, NLRB v. Radio & Television Broadcast Engineers,
364 U.S. 573 (1961); strikes for recognition where another union is certified, Bonnaz Hand
Embroiderers, Ill N.L.R.B. 82, 35 L.R.R.M. 1424 (1955), enforcement denied on other
grounds, 230 F.2d 47 (D.C. Cir. 1956); and strikes in the face of no-strike clauses, NLRB v.
Draper Corp., 145 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1944).
" Unlawful means include sit-down strikes, Apex Hosiery Co. v. Lender, 310 U.S. 469
(1940); strikes by a minority of employees without the authorization of the majority, Plastic-
line, Inc. v. NLRB, 278 F.2d 482 (6th Cir. 1960); partial strikes, NLRB v. Blade Mfg. Co.,
344 F.2d 998 (8th Cir. 1965); and strikes involving aggravated violence, NLRB v. Fansteel
Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939); NLRB v. Thayer Co., 213 F.2d 748 (Ist Cir.), cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 883 (1954).
45 See, e.g., United Furniture Workers of America v. NLRB, 336 F.2d 738 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 838 (1964); Rocky Mountain Prestress, 172 N.L.R.B. 793, 68 L.R.R.M.
1325 (1968).
" 120 CONG. REc. 6941 (daily ed. May 2, 1974).
91 See, e.g., United Parcel Service, 205 N.L.R.B. No. 163, 84 L.R.R.M. 1098 (1973),
where the Board upheld discharges when employees picketed in the face of a valid no-strike
clause without invoking the grievance machinery of the contract. Acts that undermine the
prerogatives of the bargaining representative have been held to be unlawful. See, e.g., NLRB
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2. Loss of Employee Status
Section 8(d) of the Act provides that employees who engage in
strike activity, as opposed to mere picketing, during the mandated
sixty-day notice period will lose their rights as employees under the
Act. As a result, they will not be entitled to reinstatement to their
vacated positions nor will they be able to vote in any elections con-
ducted during their absence."8 The notice must be given to the FMCS,
appropriate state agencies, and the employer; failure to give notice
to the federal and state mediation services results in a § 8(b)(3) viola-
tion, even if notice was given to the employer. 9
Section 8(d) previously read: "Any employee who engages in a
strike within the sixty-day period specified in this subsection, shall
lose his status as an employee .... " The new language modifies
that section:
Any employee who engages in a strike within any notice period
specified in this subsection, or who engages in any strike within the
appropriate period specified in subsection (g) of this section, shall
lose his status as an employee of the employer engaged in the
particular labor dispute ...
Therefore, an employee may lose his protected status for engag-
ing in strike activity where the notice requirements of §§ 8(d) or 8(g)
have not been met. 70
Employees who only picket, rather than engaging in strikes or
work stoppages which violate § 8(g), do not automatically lose their
status as employees under § 8(d). However, where the picketing re-
sults in individual refusals to cross the picket line (as opposed to a
v. Draper Corp., 145 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1944); Plastic-line, Inc. v. NLRB, 278 F.2d 482 (6th
Cir. 1960). But see Hoffman Beverage Co., 163 N.L.R.B. 981, 65 L.R.R.M. 1011 (1967) where
the Board stated that an employer violated the Act by discharging employees who refused to
cross picket lines despite their union's instructions to keep working. The Board found that the
union had impliedly supported the employees' actions, but in any event the refusal to work was
not in derogation of the union's bargaining position.
In Electrical Workers v. NLRB, 202 F.2d 186 (D.C. Cir. 1952), the court stated that the
protections afforded by § 7 of the Act are withdrawn if the concerted activities contravene
specific provisions or "basic policies" of the Act. This would appear to apply to the notice
provisions of § 8(g), in light of the remarks of Senator Taft and Representative Ashbrook and
the "basic policy" of affording advance notice of strikes or picketing to the health care institu-
tion so that the ultimate goal of patient health care may be maintained.
"' NLRB v. Lion Oil Co., 352 U.S. 282 (1957); United Packinghouse Workers v. NLRB,
210 F.2d 325 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 822 (1954).
69 United Furniture Workers v. NLRB, 336 F.2d 738 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
838 (1964).
11 Fort Smith Chair Company, 143 N.L.R.B. 514, 53 L.R.R.M. 1313 (1963), enfd, 336
F.2d 738 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 838 (1964).
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concerted work stoppage), a violation of § 8(g) will nonetheless occur
if the required notices have not been tendered. As a result, participa-
tion in the illegal picketing will amount to unprotected activity, and
any ensuing discharges for that reason would be privileged. 7' More-
over, reinstatement of discharged employees will be denied where a
strike is conducted in an unlawful manner or for an unlawful objec-
tive.12
As the worker's status as an "employee" is determined by the
Board, the possibility that this protected status may be lost increases
the importance of Board determinations regarding the legality of
strikes or pickets. For example, if the noticed strike does not occur
as scheduled and a hygenic regard for the remainder of the statutory
elements is not practiced by tendering an additional twelve hours
notice, it is possible that striking employees will lose their protected
status, even though the required initial notice was actually given to
the employer. The vulnerable position of employees, acting either
alone or on directions from their labor organization, and their good
faith in engaging in the questioned activities, will be factors to be
balanced in Board review of and determination of appropriate reme-
dies for alleged unlawful strikes and picketing. These statements
"greatly alarmed" Senator Williams, who felt that the drafting com-
mittee never intended such a harsh result for the 8(g) violations.73 He
believed the Board should be very hesitant to attach such Draconian
consequences to the ill-considered actions of the employees or their
union leaders.74
While the resolution of this operational dichotomy will presuma-
bly be left to administrative or judicial epiphany, it appears that the
intent of the amended Act is clearly that if a strike is undertaken in
derogation of the ten-day notice period of § 8(g) (as well as those
within § 8(d), the employee will forfeit his protected status. While this
may be a "harsh" result for the unwitting employee, it is no more
harsh than the probable consequences of violations of the previous
7 Claremont Polychemical Corp., 196 N.L.R.B. 613, 80 L.R.R.M. 1130 (1972).
2 NLRB v. Drivers Local 639 (Curtis Bros., Inc.), 362 U.S. 274 (1960).
" 120 CONG. REc. 12104 (daily ed. July 10, 1974).
, The General Counsel has concluded that no violation of §§ 8(a)(3) and (1) occurred
where an employer discharged employees after a strike occurred without prior service of the
notice required under § 8(g). In this case, the discharged union president had instructed employ-
ees to honor a picket line, and it was also found that the pickets had induced other employees
to refrain from crossing the picket line. Because the union was therefore held responsible for
the work stoppage and had struck and picketed in violation of Section 8(g), the participating
employees lost their "employee" status by virtue of Section 8(d). The discharges were therefore
not violations of the Act. General Counsel Monthly Report on Health Care Institution Cases,
Third Report, Section IV, 88 L.R.R. 182 (1975).
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language of § 8(d), and it appears to be consistent with the paramount
legislative intent to protect health care employers from surprise
strikes. The fact that employees may lose their protected status, al-
lowing the employer to discharge and permanently replace them, may
have the in terrorem effect of making the unions especially careful
to abide by the notice requirements. As a subsidiary effect, the
"harshness" of the statute will, as a practical matter, place great
emphasis on the two situations in which strike activity is sanctioned
without the § 8(g) notices.
The employee will not lose his protected status if the strikes are
to protest "flagrant" or "serious" unfair labor practices by the insti-
tution, or where the conduct is occasioned by the employer's abuse
of the ten day notice period.75 In this regard, the exception to § 8(g)
will insulate, or retroactively excuse, employee economic activity dur-
ing that period, even though the justification arises after the initial
violation.
However, where it is decided that, for example, no "flagrant"
unfair labor practices have been committed to excuse union activity,
and a resulting violation of § 8(g) occurs, it is still possible that while
the employees may be engaged in unprotected activity, they will not
automatically lose their "employee" status, unless it is shown that the
employees had engaged in a strike, as distinguished from mere picket-
ing. This conclusion is based upon the statutory language of § 8(d)
which provides for loss of employee status where an employee en-
gages in "any strike within the appropriate period specified in subsec-
tion (g) . . . ." The distinction between "loss of employee status"
and "unprotected conduct" becomes critical in the discharge situa-
tion. If an employee engages in unprotected activity, the employer
may lawfully discharge the employee, provided that the discharge is
the result of that activity (i.e., the picketing), rather than for reasons
unrelated to that conduct. Therefore, although the employees may be
subject to discharge for unprotected activity,7 they do not lose their
status under the Act, and an employer may not justify a discharge
or refusal of reinstatement actually based on unrelated discrimina-
tory reasons on the pretext of the unprotected conduct.
E. Threats to Strike or Picket
When Congress instituted the requirement of a ten-day notice
period prior to commencement of a strike or picket activity at a
health care institution, it also considered the occasion where a labor
71 See notes 48-57 supra and accompanying text.
76 Claremont Polychemical Corp., 196 N.L.R.B. 613, 88 L.R.R.M. 1130 (1972).
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organization would merely threaten such action within the protected
time period, with perhaps as debilitating an impact on the bargaining
stance of the employer as if the activity had actually occurred.
Clearly, the law provides that a ten-day notice must be given
before any picketing or strike may commence at a health care institu-
tion. However, the amendment makes no mention of threats to en-
gage in such activity. In a literal and simplistic sense, the amendment
can be read to restrict only the actual activities mentioned, and conse-
quently, no violation of § 8(g) would arise without the actual comm-
encement of the strike or picketing. Such a view was propounded by
Senator Williams, who rejected any interpretation that § 8(g) would
make the mere intent to withdraw services without giving the requi-
site notice an unfair labor practice.77 In Senator Williams' opinion,
if Congress had intended the mere threat to engage in the activity to
be a violation, it would have explicitly stated so, as it previously had
done when it enacted § 8(b)(4), 71 concerning unlawful secondary activ-
ity.
The General Counsel has refused to issue a § 8(g) complaint
where a union threatened to strike or picket and where no § 8(g)
notices were given, unless it could be found that the threats contained
an indication that the strike or picket would occur at a specific date
in the future. In the General Counsel's view, a threat to strike or
picket will amount to a violation only where the threats indicate that
the activity will take place within the prohibited time frame. How-
ever, a threat to engage in a strike or picket without specifying a date
and time might constitute a violation of § 8(g) if "the surrounding
circumstances" reveal an intention to strike or picket at a proscribed
time. 9
On the other hand, it was clearly recognized that actions in
violation of the notice requirements of § 8(g) can be enjoined by the
Board, which would indicate that a charge and complaint should issue
upon the mere threat to picket without the requisite notice. The
legislative history also indicates that one of the purposes of the notice
requirement is to give the NLRB the opportunity, after a complaint
is filed, to ascertain the legality of the strikes or pickets before they
T1 120 CONG. REc. 12103 (daily ed. July 10, 1974). Senator Williams did suggest however,
that violations of § 8(g) can be remedied by resort to § 10j), which allows the NLRB to seek
an injunction to curtail the unfair practice.
78 Id. at § 12104.
" General Counsel Monthly Report on Health Care Institution Cases, First Report,
Section I, 88 L.R.R. 8 (1975). Therefore, it is suggested that the employer, upon receiving
threats of such actions, question the union concerning the precise time that the union plans to
begin the threatened conduct.
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occur."0 It is clear that the labor organizations have a right to strike
or picket, unless such action would be unlawful. The unlawful nature
of the activity may arise not only from a failure to give notices, but
also because it violates related sections of the Act, such as unlawful
secondary pressure, or recognitional or organizational pickets at an
institution where another union is currently certified. If a union gives
notice of a strike or picketing and the noticed employer concludes
that such activity would be unlawful, it would be consonant with the
legislative intent to protect the continuity of patient care that the
threatened employer be able to enlist the remedial powers of the
NLRB before the debilitating activity actually occurs.
Moreover, continuing threats to either the primary employer or
peripheral employers, if not an unlawful activity, would have the
effect of jeopardizing patient care and would allow the union to bring
effective pressure to bear on the employer without suffering a corre-
sponding economic hardship. Although the threat may amount to a
violation of other sections of the Act (e.g., §§ 8(b)(4), 8(b)(7), or
8(b)(3), it is not clear that such sections will adequately guard the
interests Congress sought to protect, especially given the multitude
of fact situations in which the threat may be communicated. Congres-
sional concern that health care institutions be given some protection
from abusive threats and that patient care be uninterrupted might be
best served by allowing Board involvement upon the filing of a com-
plaint seeking injunctive relief while unlawful activity is merely
threatened, before its full impact is suffered.
F. Secondary Activity
Section 8(b)(4) of the National Labor Relations Act"' prohibits
union conduct which is intended to induce strikes or concerted work
stoppages by employees in the course of their employment with the
object of forcing any employer or person to cease doing business with
another employer or person. Section 10(1)2 provides that an injunc-
tion can be sought from a federal district court if reasonable grounds
exist to believe that a secondary boycott has occurred, and § 303 of
the Labor Management Relations Act 3 allows for the recovery of
damages occasioned by the unlawful activity proscribed in § 8(b)(4).
The policy that demands that innocent third parties be protected
S. REP. No. 766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1974); H.R. REP. No. 1051, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 5 (1974); 120 CONG. REc. 6932 (daily ed. May 2, 1974) (remarks of Senator Cranston).
St 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1970).
29 U.S.C. § 160(1) (1970).
29 U.S.C. § 187 (1970).
HEALTH CARE INSTITUTIONS
from labor disputes "not their own" affords no protection to an
employer who is so closely identified or allied with the primary em-
ployer that he ceases to be a neutral. Accordingly, the Board has held
that the secondary boycott provisions of the Act are not intended to
protect an employer who cooperates with the employer that is the
object of the union activity and who performs the work that the
affected employer is unable to complete. The "ally doctrine" has been
developed to allow union activity to be directed toward an employer
who so aids the primary target of the union activity. 4
Both the House and Senate Committee Reports contained this
identical language:
It is the sense of the Committee that where such secondary institu-
tions accept the patients of a primary employer or otherwise provide
life-sustaining services to the primary employer by providing the
primary employer with an employee or employees who possess criti-
cal skills, such as an EKG technician, such conduct shall not be
sufficient to cause the secondary employer to lose its neutral status.
It should be clear, however, that where a secondary employer en-
meshes itself into the primary dispute by providing supervisors,
nurses or staff other than those described, it loses its status of
neutrality."
The strict ally doctrine has thus been modified, congruent with con-
gressional interest in continued patient care. It is readily apparent
that the objective sought is the protection of the interchange of em-
ployees who possess critical skills so that the congressional goal of
uninterrupted health care services may be attained. Thus, the Board
will be engaged in evaluating the "critical" nature of an employee's
skills as well as whether the aid given by the purportedly neutral
employer is designed to preserve the integrity of the health care or,
conversely, to allow the primary employer to withstand the union
activity.
The General Counsel has opined that if the ally employer were
to be struck or picketed, the ten day notice required under § 8(g) must
nevertheless be given prior to the commencement of such activity. 8
Notwithstanding Senator Williams' disagreement," it would appear
" Laundry, Cleaning & Dye House Workers, 164 N.L.R.B. 426, 65 L.R.R.M. 1091
(1967). The United States Supreme Court has not committed itself as to the ally doctrine. Sen.
Taft stated that he has "serious questions" as to the legal validity of the doctrine. 120 CoNG.
Rac. 6941 (daily ed. May 2, 1974).
5 S. REP. No. 93-766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6(1974); H.R. RaP. No. 93-1051, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. 7 (1974).
" N.L.R.B. General Counsel, supra note 30.
" 120 CONG. REC. 12105 (daily ed. July 10, 1974).
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that where the "ally" is a health care institution, it would be conso-
nant with the paramount congressional objective of protecting the
public and the continuity of health services that the notice periods be
afforded these employers also. Although it is arguable that an ally
will be cognizant of its involvement in an ongoing labor dispute and
that it should therefore accept the consequences of its acts, Congress
has recognized that some aid to struck employers is not only allowed
but necessary.
The possible abuse inherent in requiring that the ten day notices
be tendered to the assisting employer is that the "ally," upon receipt
of the notice of intended strike or picket activity, will suspend the
assistance to the struck employer, wait 72 hours (thereby necessitat-
ing an additional ten day notice from the union), and then resume his
efforts. To obviate this emasculation of the notice protection the
original notice given to the "ally" should be construed to cover all
later instances of assistance, as long as the form of the assistance
remains unchanged.
The supply of critical services should be encouraged rather than
discouraged, so that in close cases the "ally" should be notified when
the union considers his actions to be of a non-critical nature. When
a disinterested employer lends employees with apparently critical
skills to a struck institution, it has no real control over the manner
in which those employees are utilized. Moreover, if the neutral em-
ployer (either another health care institution or a supplier of neces-
sary articles) provides requested supplies to the struck employer, it
has little or no way of knowing if such supplies are critically needed
or if they are merely being stockpiled, nor is it able to control the
manner in which the supplies may be used. Where the public interest
is paramount, employers should be encouraged to err on the side of
continuing health care services.
G. Recognitional and Organizational Picketing
Section 8(b)(7)88 places limitations on picketing, where an object
of that activity is "recognition," "bargaining," or "organization." In
those cases where recognitional or organizational picketing is counte-
nanced, its duration may nevertheless be limited to a reasonable
period "not to exceed thirty days," unless a representation petition
is filed prior to the expiration of that period. Without such a filing,
picketing beyond whatever is deemed to be a "reasonable period" will
result in a violation of § 8(b)(7)(C). 89
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7) (1970).
" See, e.g., Hod Carriers, Local 840 (C.A. Blinne Const. Co.), 135 N.L.R.B. 1153, 49
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Both Committee Reports contained the following language:
In recognition picketing cases under Section 8(b)(7)(C), the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has ruled that a reasonable period of
time is thirty days absent unusual circumstances such as violance
or intimidation. It is the sense of the Committee that picketing of
a health care institution would in itself constitute an unusual cir-
cumstance justifying the application of a period of time less than
thirty days."
Senators Williams and Taft disagreed as to whether such picket-
ing should be completely banned, or whether it should be allowed
only in the most "exceptional" circumstances. Senator Williams con-
cluded that, in the absence of violence, picketing at a health care
institution for a period less than thirty days would not necessarily be
inappropriate." Conversely, Senator Taft stated:
I can think of no justifiable reason for recognition picketing of a
health care institution and would expect the Board to permit such
picketing only in the most exceptional circumstances, and then for
a period of time substantially less than 30 days.2
The legislative history resounds with proclamations that enact-
ment of the amendment will decrease the frequency of, and obviate
the need for, recognitional strikes in the health care industry. While
the occasion and necessity for recognitional picketing should be re-
duced, it is not improbable that they will occur. It is submitted that
the Committees' language that such picketing is itself an "exceptional
circumstance," coupled with the overriding concern for effective pa-
tient care, should provide sufficient impetus and justification for swift
Board action to curtail quickly the picketing activity.
It is anticipated that a new standard will be developed which will
define what will be deemed to be a "reasonable" time for recogni-
tional or organizational picketing activity at a health care institution.
General Counsel Nash indicates that relevant factors in the develop-
ment of such a standard would include "the nature of the illness being
L.R.R.M. 1638 (1962). The Board has exercised its discretion to determine when circumstances
justify shortening the thirty day period set out in the statute. Ten days, for example, was held
to be unreasonable when picketing was accompanied by acts of violence or intimidation. Cuneo
v. United Shoe Workers of America, 181 F. Supp. 324 (D.N.J. 1960). Additionally, where an
employer suffered severe economic damage, fifteen days was held to be unreasonable. Elliott
v. Sapula Typographical Union No. 4809, 45 L.R.R.M. 2400 (N.D. Okla. 1959).
" S. REP. No. 766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1974); H.R. REP. No. 1051, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 7 (1974).
"120 CoNG. REC. 12105 (daily ed. July 10, 1974).
n 120 CONG. REc. 6940 (daily ed. May 2, 1974).
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treated at .the picketing institution" and "the effects of the picketing
on the institution's ability to treat its patients." 3
H. Section 10(j) Injunctive Relief
The NLRB is given the power to petition a federal district court
for temporary relief or restraining orders after the issuance of a
complaint charging an unfair labor practice. Injunctive relief has
been granted where the notice requirements of § 8(d) of the Act have
not been met.94
Due to the need to avoid disruption of patient care, the Commit-
tee Reports state that the failure to give statutory notice required by
§ 8(g) will be met with remedial action under § 100) of the Act. 5
Therefore, the new unfair labor practice of striking or picketing a
health care institution without first giving ten days notice will be met
with the injunctive relief response. However, the initial indication is
that this injunctive relief will not be forthcoming upon the mere threat
to strike or picket in contravention of the ten day notice require-
ment."
It has also been suggested that the public "right" to uninter-
rupted health care, especially in the event of the threatened discontin-
uance of health care (including emergency treatment) to potentially
large segments of a population, would permit invocation of the in-
junction provisions of § 208 of the Taft-Hartley Act.17 Senator Javits
would favor an amendment to the National Emergency provision of
the Taft-Hartley injunction sections, designed to cover regional
rather than only national health and safety emergencies. Such an
amendment would be similar to § 10 of the Railway Labor Act, which
basically provides a sixty-day "cooling off" period in the case of a
labor dispute which "threatens to deprive any section of the country
of essential transportation services." 9
IV. BARGAINING PROCEDURES
A. Section 8(d)
Existing § 8(d) has been amended by modifying the notice provi-
's N.L.R.B. General Counsel, supra note 30, at 15,245.
" See, e.g., McLeod v. Local 147, AFL-CIO, 292 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1961); Kaynard v.
Communication Workers of America, 72 L.R.R.M. 2876 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
11 S. REP. No. 766, 83d Cong., 2d Sess 4 (1974); H.R. REP. No. 1051, 93d Cong., 2d Sess
5 (1974).
98 N.L.R.B. General Counsel, supra note 30.
120 CONG. REC. 6941 (daily ed. May 2, 1974) (remarks of Sen. Taft).
" 120 CONG. REc. 6935 (daily ed. May 2, 1974).
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sions of that section to require (a) ninety day notice prior to the
termination or expiration of a contract, (b) sixty day notice to the
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (and appropriate state
agency) prior to the termination or expiration of a contract, (c) thirty
day notice to the FMCS, required in the instance of initial contract
negotiations, and (d) participation by the health care institution and
labor union in mediation at the direction of the FMCS. It is clear
from the legislative history that, while these new provisions apply
strictly to the health care institution, all of the existing prohibitions
and requirements of § 8(d) will also apply to that industry, including
the prohibition on strikes or work stoppages during such periods.99
The new language of § 8(d) provides that a party that desires to
modify or terminate an existing contract in the health care industry
must serve written notice of the proposed modification or termination
upon the other party to the contract ninety days prior to the expira-
tion date of the contract. Thereafter, both the FMCS and the applica-
ble state agency must be notified sixty days prior to the actual or
proposed termination or modification date.
The new statutory language provides:
Whenever the collective bargaining involves employees of a health
care institution . . . the notice period of section 8(d)(3) shall be
sixty days.
After literally substituting the sixty day language, § 8(d)(3) would
read that the party desiring the termination or modification must
"notify the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service within sixty
days after such notice of the existence of a dispute . . ." A labor
union could comply with the statutory language by serving written
notice of proposed modification on the hospital ninety days prior to
the expiration date of the contract and simultaneously notifying the
FMCS of the existence of the dispute. 100
Under § 213(c), a maximum thirty day period is set within which
a Board of Inquiry may be established pursuant to § 213(a), and
during which no change in the status quo may be made by the parties
to the controversy. Presumably, after this thirty day hiatus, the par-
ties are free to act pursuant to their best interests. Under the above-
" 120 CONG. REc. 6941 (daily ed. May 2, 1974) (remarks of Sen. Taft).
IN The FMCS reports that some difficulties have been encountered with respect to nego-
tiations for initial contracts. Early practice under the amendments shows that unions file notices
of disputes as a matter of course, as a self-protective measure. The effect of such a filing is
that the FMCS must then decide within ten days whether or not to appoint a Board of Inquiry,
even though bargaining is progressing without any evidence that a strike will result. The FMCS
investigations concern the availability of health care services in the affected locality, and those
investigations tend to be time-consuming and often unnecessary.
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described scheme, the labor union could bring effective pressure to
bear on the employer, unhampered by the status quo standard, as
much as thirty days prior to the termination of the contract.
This reading of the statute is untenable in terms of a rational
consideration of the goals and objectives of the legislation and in light
of its legislative history. It is clear that Congress intended that the
FMCS be notified within sixty days of the termination or modifica-
tion date, rather than the date that notice is given to the health care
institution. The Committee Reports state that:
Under the existing provisions of the National Labor Relations Act,
an employer or a labor organization is required, where a collective
bargaining agreement is in effect, to provide written notice to the
other party . . . at least sixty days prior to the termination or
modification date ...
The bill extends the sixty day notice to ninety days and requires the
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service to receive sixty days
notice instead of thirty days, in the case of health care institutions.'1,
The FMCS and the applicable state agencies were intended to
receive notice within thirty days after the notice given to the em-
ployer; more importantly, they were intended to have at least sixty
days in which to attempt to mediate or conciliate the potential dis-
pute; This construction is supported by the abundant remarks in the
legislative history regarding the sixty day notice requirement to the
FMCS, 12 the patent objectives of the statute, and its logical integra-
tion with the provisions of § 213. Any other reading would contravene
the basic admonition against exalting form over substance.
The effect of the new provisions is that the existing contract must
remain in full effect during a ninety day period, in which it is antici-
pated that the parties will negotiate toward meaningful settlement of
the differences between them. To further the parties' ability to resolve
these differences, the FMCS and its potential offspring, the Board of
Inquiry, must also be involved in the settlement procedure. Neither
party may engage in a strike or a lockout during this time period.
In the case of bargaining for an initial agreement, the law pro-
vides that thirty days notice of the existence of a dispute must be
given to the agencies set forth in § 8(d)(3). When this notice require-
"', S. REP. No. 93-766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1974); H.R. REP. No. 93-1051, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. 6 (1974).
102 120 CONG. REc. 6934 (daily ed. May 2, 1974). See also, 120 CONG. REc. 12103 (daily
ed. May 2, 1974) (remarks of Sen. Williams); Id. at 6941 (remarks of Sen. Taft); 120 CONG.
REc. 6932 (daily ed. July 11, 1974) (remarks of Sen. Cranston); Id. at 6935 (remarks of Sen.
Javits); Id. at 4589 (remarks of Rep. Ashbrook); Id. at 4592 (remarks of Rep. Kemp); Id. at
4600 (remarks Rep. Erlenborn; Id at 6392 (remarks of Rep. Thompson).
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ment is combined with the ten day notice provision previously dis-
cussed, it is clear that an effective period of forty days exists during
which the parties may negotiate their differences, and during which
no strike or lockout may occur."0 3
B. Mediation
In addition to the notice requirements and time restrictions con-
tained in § 8(d), the health care institution and labor organization will
be required to participate in mediation at the direction of the FMCS.
The new legislation adds an entirely novel section to the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, § 213, which deals with conciliation of
labor disputes in the health care industry. This section states that if
the Director of the FMCS concludes that strike or lockout activity
will "substantially interrupt the delivery of health care in the locality
concerned," and impartial Board of Inquiry may be convened
"within thirty days after the notice to the Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service" required by § 8(d)(3), or within ten days after
the notice required where the bargaining is for an initial agreement.
This Board is to make a written report to the parties, within fifteen
days after the establishment of the Board, to recite the findings of fact
along with recommendations for "prompt, peaceful and just settle-
ment of the dispute." Once the Board is established, and for fiteen
days after its report has been issued, the parties may not change the
status quo "in effect prior to the expiration of the contract" or "in
effect prior to the time of the impasse," except by agreement. 4
203 An employer's duty to bargain with the union may be suspended or extinguished if
the union engages in strikes or picketing in violation of§ 8(d)(B) or §.8(g) of the Act. In NLRB
v. Fort Smith Chair Company, 336 F.2d 738 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 838 (1964),
the evidence showed that employees had engaged in a strike without giving the required notice,
that the discharge of the employees was therefore lawful, and that the employer had no duty
to bargain with the union after it had lost its majority status. In United Electrical, Radio &
Machine Workers v. NLRB, 223 F.2d 228 (D.C. Cir. 1955), the court held that where a strike
occurred without the required notice to the employer and FMCS, the strikers immediately lost
their status as employees, and the company could thereafter cancel and rescind the collective
bargaining agreement.
I" Once a union desires to withdraw the notice to FMCS and call off the Board of Inquiry
investigation, it must notify the FMCS that it does not intend to strike and that the Board of
Inquiry is unnecessary. FMCS must also receive a similar notice from the employer before the
statutory procedure can be aborted. 87 Lab. Rel. Rep. 144 (1974).
The FMCS reports that the new legislation has resulted in more activity for the Service
than was originally anticipated. As of September 25, 1974, about two months after the
enactment of the bill, and one month after its effective date, the FMCS had received 325 §
8(d)(3) notices of initial contract disputes or intent to modify existing agreements. As of that
date, however, the FMCS had appointed only one Board of Inquiry, and the FMCS Director
of Mediation Services indicated that most parties would rather come to their own settlement
than have the Inquiry Board appointed. 87 Lab. Rel. Rep. 144 (1974).
36 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL 235 (1975)
From the language of § 213, the conciliation procedure is to
apply to disputes arising before contract termination or during nego-
tiations for an initial agreement. As such, it will not be invoked when
a strike occurs during the contract term or after the contract was
terminated, and for example, would have had no interplay in resolu-
tion of strikes such as that which crippled New York City in 1973 or
the 1974 California nurses' strike.
The procedure as outlined is an embodiment of the House desire
to write an explicit "cooling off" period into the new legislation.
Representatives Clay and Erlenborn proposed an amendment which
gave the FMCS the discretionary power to impose a sixty day cooling
off period after the statutory negotiation period had expired. For the
first thirty days of this period, a special fact finding board would have
been appointed. The remainder of the time, still under the stabilizing
blanket of the status quo restriction, would have been devoted to
negotiations and, hopefully, resolution of the dispute."5 The cooling
off period was analogized to the experiences and existence of similar
provisions under the Railway Labor Act.0 ' Communities and areas
effectively served by only one hospital might particulary have benefit-
ted from passage of the amendment.'
Opponents argued that the cooling off period would not afford
the desired additional opportunity to resolve the issues between the
parties without sacrificing the public concern for health care.'
Rather, according to this argument, it would only prolong and inter-
fere with the obligations to bargain in. good faith, as positions would
become inflexible in anticipation of real resolution during the "extra"
negotiating stage.' The decision was ultimately made that the legis-
lation would adequately encourage dispute resolution prior to con-
tract termination, without prolonging tensions and emotions inherent
in such situations to a period of five months.
Congress rejected the House proposal for a sixty-day cooling off
period because it was anticipated that it would neither eliminate work
stoppages nor reduce tensions associated with labor disputes, and in
fact, would have heightened tensions between parties and unnecessar-
ily prolonged the labor dispute. As such, this interference with the
"normal" bargaining process was thought to be detrimental to the
101 120 CONG. REC. 4590 (daily ed. May 30, 1974).
106 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1970).
"I Other Representatives were opposed to granting the right to impose an agency shop,
or to the grant of the right to strike, even if such right might be qualified by a "cooling-off"
period. See, e.g., 120 CONG. REc. 4592 (daily ed. May 30, 1974) (remarks of Rep. Henderson).
10 120 CONG. REc. 6397 (daily ed. July 11, 1974) (remarks of Rep. Dellenback).
00 120 CONG. REC. 6398 (daily ed. July 11, 1974) (remarks of Rep. Hillis).
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parties.110 The legislation, as enacted, eliminated the sixty day cooling
off period in favor of preserving the mandatory mediation procedures
of the FMCS as a dispute resolution mechanism prior to the impasse
stage of the negotiations.
Although it is anticipated that the appointment of an impartial
Board of Inquiry will enhance those procedures of the FMCS, it is
difficult to perceive how the "normal" bargaining process will con-
tinue after such a Board is convened. In addition, the requirement
that the Board of Inquiry be convened within thirty days of notice to
FMCS if an impasse seems imminent requires that the Director of
FMCS be able to predict, far in advance of ultimate resolution, that
an impasse will surface and that the dispute will substantially inter-
rupt the delivery of health care services.
The actual conduct and "frame of reference" of the Board of
Inquiry, of course, are not dictated by the legislation. While the input
of the Board will be developed through practice it was suggested that
the Board act with cognizance of the congressional intent of redress-
ing past discrimination against employees in non-profit health care
institutions. Consequently, it was recommended that the Board con-
sider (a) a comparison of the annual income of the employees in
question and those employed in enterprises of a similar size in the
locality, (b) adequate protection for job security and fringe benefits,
(c) cott of living increases, (d) career advancement, (e) equal employ-
ment opportunity, (f) equal pay, (g) the possibility of grievance reso-
lution without the resort to strikes, and (h) job training and skills.'11
It is not presently known whether the Board will adopt such a sympa-
thetic view toward the asserted plight of the employees.
The intended impact of the new law is substantial. Senator Taft
expressed it as follows:
[T]he health care institution and labor organization will be required
to participate in mediation at the direction of the FMCS. Unlike
private industry, where mediation is discretionary with the dispu-
tants, parties in the health care industry are statutorily obligated to
utilize FMCS services. This provision insures the active involvement
of the Federal Mediation Service who will attempt, by use of its
expertise, to adjust the disputes expeditiously.
The appointment of the board will not interrupt the mandatory
mediation process. Mediation will continue while the board per-
forms its critical function. These procedures are intended, and
HI 120 CONG. REc. 12103 (daily ed. July 10, 1974) (remarks of Sen. Williams).
I 120 CONG. REc. 6392 (daily ed. July 11, 1974) (remarks of Rep. Thompson).
274 36 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL 235 (1975)
should go a long way, to achieve a prompt and peaceful adjustment
of the dispute. The new procedures not only provide the parties with
more time to reach a settlement, without resorting to strike, but also
afford the FMCS a greater and more meaningful opportunity to
work with them toward that end.112
General Counsel Nash has offered the opinion that while the
amendment to § 8(d) do not deal expressly with lockouts by employ-
ers during initial bargaining situations, § 213 reflects a congressional
intent to maintain a status quo, which would preclude strikes or
lockouts during the period in which the procedures outlined therein
are in operation. Mr. Nash also states:
And even for the ten-day period before the Section 213 Board of
Inquiry is established, Congress may well have intended to proscribe
not only strikes, but also resort by either party to economic force
to change the status quo. In either circumstance, the health care
institution may be in derogation of the statutory requirements, and
a Section 8(a)(5) complaint may be warranted." 3
It should be noted that the mere proscription of economic pres-
sure during protected periods, or at all, does not provide an absolute
guarantee against such activity. (In fact, the hospital strikes in New
York and California were undertaken in violation of court orders
seeking to prevent or curtail those actions.)' 4
C. Bargaining Conduct
1. Bargaining Subjects
To those who decisively strike the balance between rights of
employees in the health services industry and the public interest in
continuity of health care services in favor of the latter, reliance by
the Conference Committee on expressions of intent to encourage
voluntary arbitration by labor unions involved in the health care
industry must be of little consolation. However,the rejected "cooling
off" period, or even compulsory arbitration,"5 cannot guarantee that
,H2 120 CONG. Rac. 12108 (daily ed. July 10, 1974). See also, remarks of Sen. Dominick,
Id. at 12109.
113 N.L.R.B. General Counsel, supra note 30.
"' 120 CONG. REC. 6898 (daily ed. July 11, 1974) (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier).
"5 Some state statutes, most notably Minnesota's, sanction collective bargaining by em-
ployees of what would be deemed "health care institutions," but prohibit the labor organization
from strikes, providing instead for compulsory arbitration of lingering disputes. It seems clear
that such laws will be pre-empted by the federal legislation. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council
v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959); Myers Bethelehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938).
While some discussion during the congressional debates referred to the ability of the NLRB
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essential health services will not be jeopardized by unilateral acts,
even though unlawful.
The sense of Congress in enacting the amendment was that rec-
ognitional strikes would be greatly reduced or eliminated by granting
employees of health care institutions rights under the National Labor
Relations Act.116 If this prophesy proves to be accurate, strike activity
in this industry will occur, if at all, when unions flex their collective
muscle to effect contract negotiations. The parties are not being
asked to assume newly passive roles, however, as it is a common
practice to include provisions calling for mandatory arbitration of
disputes in the collective bargaining agreements involving health care
institutions. It has been estimated that seventy-five percent of the
contracts already existing in the health care field so provide, and
moreover, that it is generally the employer-hospital that resists such
a curtailment of management prerogative. 1 7
There are at least two forms of arbitration currently prevalent
in labor relations practice. "Rights" or "grievance" arbitration is
used to describe the procedure involving contract interpretation or
application. In the second form, "interest" arbitration, the arbitrator
is asked to supply the very language and content of the collective
bargaining agreement, after the parties reach an impasse in their
bargaining procedure. The present position of the NLRB is that "in-
terest" arbitration is not a mandatory subject of bargaining." 8
The Conference Committee stated that it recognized the need for
the continuity of health services during disputes in this particular
industry and pointed to the public declaration by certain labor unions
that they would attempt to generate support for the acceptance of
arbitration in the event of an impasse in the negotiating process."'
under § 10(a) of the Act to cede jurisdiction to the states, such a hope seems illusory in light of
the fact that the Board has not yet deferred to the states under that section. Additionally,
Senator Williams specifically cautioned the Board to be circumspect in considering ceding
jurisdiction, in the interest of promoting a uniform "national pattern of collective bargaining"
in this field. 120 CoNG. REC. 12104 (daily ed. July 10, 1974).
11 See, e.g., 120 CONG. REc. 6394 (daily ed. July 11, 1974) (remarks of Rep. Thompson).
"' 120 CONG. REC. 6394 (daily ed. July I1, 1974) (remarks of Rep. Ashbrook).
11 "Mandatory" subjects fall within the generic description of "wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment," they must be bargained about in good faith by both
sides, and the party proposing the subject may insist, to impasse, that it be included in the
ultimate agreement.
M S. REP. No. 1175, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1974). Four labor unions, National Union
of Hospital and Nursing Home Employees, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Service
Employees International Union, and Laborers International Union of North America, filed
letters in which they pledged their best efforts to persuade their affiliates to voluntarily avoid
work stoppages, through utilization of the arbitration procedures upon the event of an impasse
situation in bargaining. Senator Javits was asked if the named four labor organizations were
36 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL 235 (1975)
The Committee stated that under the procedures enunciated in the
new legislation, "it is anticipated that, in the event of such impasse,
the findings of fact and recommendations of the Board of Inquiry
would provide the framework of the arbitrator's decison."'' 1 The
General Counsel's view is that the language of the Conference Report
encourages the use of "interest arbitration" may augur, at least in the
health care industry, a re-evaluation of the present tendency to hold
that "interest" arbitration is not a mandatory subject of bargain-
ing. 12
The Board has previously given support to the concept that a
body of "management rights" or "management prerogatives" exists
which often operates to curtail significantly the scope of bargaining
and negotiating discussions.12 2 However, this traditional principle has
not been without challenge.12
Although it is clear that imposition of the duty to bargain over
a particular subject does not completely destroy managerial freedom,
as there is no requirement of concession or agreement to the pro-
posal, it is foreseeable. that management will often be reluctant to
agree to submit unresolved matters of negotiation to an arbitrator.
Most employers do not welcome the presence of a union as a "part-
ner" in their business; even fewer, it is suspected, relish the thought
that a third party will be called upon to dictate the terms of the
collective bargaining agreement that is to impose substantial finan-
cial burdens and limitations on the employer's freedom to act in a
unilateral manner.
all of the unions that dealt with hospital workers, and the Senator responded that "they are
the primary trade unions in the field," and further that any other labor organizations involved
would be comparatively small.
120 S. REP. No. 93-1175, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1974).
2 N.L.R.B. General Counsel, supra note 30.
122 The Board, in General Motors, 191 N.L.R.B. No. 149, 77 L.R.R.M. 1537 (1971), took
the view championed by Justice Stewart's concurrence in Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v.
NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964), to the effect that the scope of bargaining under § 8(d) was to be
considered in light of management prerogatives. Justice Stewart's earlier opinion stated:
"[T]hose management decisions which are fundamental to the basic direction of a corporate
enterprise or which impinge only indirectly upon employment security should be excluded from
that area [of mandatory subjects of bargaining]." Id. at 223. The Board was substantiated when
the General Motors decision was affirmed on appeal. Local 864, U.A.W. v. NLRB, 470 F.2d
442 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See also, Summit Tooling, 195 N.L.R.B. 479, 79 L.R.R.M. 1396 (1972);
contra, Johnson's Industrial Caterers, 197 N.L.R.B. 352, 80 L.R.R.M. 1344 (1972).
The Supreme Court, in a footnote reference in Allied Chem. Workers Local 1 v. Pittsburgh
Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, n.19 (1971) stated:
This is not to say that the application of Oliver and Fibreboard turns only on the
impact of the third-party matter on employee interests. Other considerations, such
as the effect on the employer's freedom to conduct his business, may be equally
important.
223 Ozark Trailers, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 561, 63 L.R.R.M. 1264 (1966).
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Although the Committee Reports cited the interest arbitration
concept as a factor that would tend to reduce strikes in the health care
field, it appears that if an employer is strongly opposed to relinquish-
ing his traditional right to control the terms of the collective bargain-
ing agreement, allowing the union to insist upon the inclusion of the
interest arbitration clause to impasse may increase, rather than de-
crease, the likelihood of strike activity in the health field. The con-
gressional decision was to adopt a system of advisory mediation and
fact-finding recommendations, which will result in informed persua-
sion designed to resolve bargaining conflicts.
Unless experience under the new legislation indicates that strikes
of this nature have a substantial effect on patient care, the Board
should be reluctant to increase the tensions encountered in the bar-
gaining process by labeling interest arbitration as a mandatory sub-
ject of bargaining. Those employers who conclude either that they are
especially vulnerable to a strike or that on a policy level, relinquish-
ment of management prerogatives is preferable to jeopardizing pa-
tient care will voluntarily accept arbitration. When dealing with a
subject which is so crucial to management and union discretion and
privilege and which may have the undesired effect of increasing the
potential of impasse situations, each party should be free to choose
whether to bargain over inclusion of the term or to agree to interest
arbitration.
2. Duty to Disclose Information
The concept that an employer has a duty to disclose requested
information to a labor organization, as an integral part of the the
duty to bargain in good faith imposed by § 8(a)(5), has developed
primarily in the area of contract negotiations; the union is entitled
to proof of assertions made by the employer at the bargaining table.' 4
However, the duty to disclose relevant information lingers beyond the
negotiation stage and extends into the period of the ongoing relation-
ship between the employer and the union. 25
The duty to furnish information during the term of an agreement
is drawn from the definition of the term "to bargain collectively",
found in § 8(d), which includes "the mutual obligation of the em-
ployer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable
times and confer in good faith with respect to . the negotiation
of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder .... The
I" NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956).
' NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432 (1967).
2 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970).
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duty has been imposed where grievances are lodged regarding as-
serted violations of the collective bargaining agreement' and in var-
ious other situations that involve the union's attempt to police or
administer a contract."' 8 The appropriate charge where the employer
refuses to disclose requested relevant information is that of a § 8(a)(5)
failure to bargain in good faith.
The General Counsel, assuming that a union does not commit
an unfair labor practice by striking or picketing in the absence of ten
day notice to the health care institution if the employer is unfairly
utilizing that hiatus period to "undermine the bargaining relation-
ship", stated:
[A] union might need information from an employer to accurately
guage the extent of the employer's activities during the ten-day
period and thereby to determine whether it is released from its
waiting obligation. Since such information might be viewed as nec-
essary for an incumbent union to properly perform its representa-
tive duties, the employer would presumably be under an obligation
to furnish to the incumbent union such relevant and necessary infor-
mation bearing on its activities. Failure to do so might constitute a
violation of Section 8(a)(5).111
The information to be disclosed would bear on the union's ability to
distinguish between activities essential to the maintenance of effective
health care and those which are designed only to augment the institu-
tion's ability to endure the strike.
Present authority indicates that the union has little or no obliga-
tion to demonstrate, at the time of the request, that the information
sought is relevant.'
Any less lenient rule in labor disputes would greatly hamper the
bargaining process, for it is virtually impossible to tell in advance
whether the requested data will be relevant except in those infre-
quent instances in which the inquiry is patently outside the bargain-
ing issues."'
I" NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432 (1967). It has also been stated that the
grievance procedure is "a part of the continuous collective bargaining process." United Steel-
workers of America v. Warrior and Gulf Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581 (1960).
I's See, e.g. NLRB v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 352 U.S. 938 (1956); J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB,
253 F.2d 149 (7th Cir. 1958); Weber Veneer & Plywood Co., 161 N.L.R.B. 1054, 63 L.R.R.M.
1395 (1966).
t2 N.L.R.B. General Counsel, supra note 30, at 15, 247-48.
I NLRB v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 352 U.S. 938 (1956), rev'g, 235 F.2d 319 (9th Cir.
1956); Timken 'Roller Bearing Co. v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 746 (6th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376
U.S. 971 (1964).
" NLRB v. Yawman & Erbe Mfg. Co., 187 F.2d 947, 949 (2d Cir. 1951).
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Upon even a cursory analysis of the stated rationaie for the
accepted duty to disclose information to the union, it is evident that
the ten-day notice period imposed by § 8(g) is not the equivalent of
the normal bargaining situation. The employer is under no statutory
duty to provide the information; in fact, the duty upon which the
disclosure requirement is based is not even universally accepted.,"
More importantly, a liberal rule requiring little or no showing of
relevancy is not justified in the notice period situation. Unlike the
bargaining process, where it is difficult to determine with any preci-
sion what information is relevant until it can be evaluated, the para-
meters of the inquiry in the notice situation are certain, in that they
are confined to ascertaining whether the employer has engaged in acts
which undermine the relationship existing between the parties.
As a practical matter, it does not appear that the ten-day notice
period will be severely jeopardized by the union's ability to secure
information regarding the employer's activities. First, ten days' time
passes quickly, especially if an employer has a notion to respond in
a sluggish or dilatory manner. Further, an evasive employer can
protect the waiting period by providing prompt but vaguely framed
responses. Second, an employer who has in fact violated the waiting
period is in a secured position so that it is not harmed by providing
the information and allowing the union to take immediate responsive
action.
Rather, it would appear that the real importance of the informa-
tion requested from the employer will be to legitimize retroactively
strike or picketing activity taken in contravention of the ten-day
notice period, regardless of the actual reasons which may have
prompted the precipitous action. In addition, the union may seek to
know the identity and terms of participation of health care institu-
tions who are to come to the assistance of the noticed employer, in
order to attempt to prevent the tender of such aid and thereby pres-
sure the original employer who will be unable to provide satisfactory
patient care. Such an abuse is particularly possible if it is determined
that the mere threat to picket or strike a health care institution (in
this instance, the neutral employer supplying life-preserving services
to the noticed employer) is not deemed a violation of § 8(g). Even
though it would appear that such activity would amount to unlawful
secondary activity, assuming the aiding employer is not termed -an
32 Although the Committee Reports stated that the employer may not use the ten-day
period to undermine the bargaining relationship, Senator Taft's remarks can be read as accept-
ing only the Mastro Plastics flagrant unfair labor practice acts as excusing the waiting require-
ment.
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"ally," the knowledge that an employer may be forced to reveal the
identity of possible sources of assistance will have a chilling effect on
the availability of such assistance, thereby critically jeopardizing pa-
tient care.
In light of these potential dangers and the inapplicability of the
traditional rationale for not requiring a showing of the relevance of
the information sought, it is suggested that the Board demand that
the union demonstrate the relevance of the information it requests
regarding a possible employer abuse of the waiting period. Moreover,
a strict standard of relevance should be applied. For example, a
relevant consideration is whether an employer has made plans to
replace employees and, if so, which particular employees and skills
are to be replaced. However, the identity of the source of the replace-
ments (e.g., which lending health care institution) is not relevant to
the question of whether such replacements have the effect of under-
mining the bargaining relationship. Additionally, a good faith requir-
ment should- be imposed on such requests, to guard against the possi-
ble danger of abusive or harrassing use of the privilege to request
information.
Given the protection of a requirement of relevance and good
faith, the employer should have no legitimate objection to providing
the data sought by the union. Such disclosure would also be consis-
tent with the legislative concern for protecting the continuity of health
care, for if the employer informs the union of the legitimacy of its
actions, unwarranted disregard of the waiting period should be pre-
vented. The forced exchange of information may also have the subsid-
iary effect of increasing effective communication between the parties,
perhaps leading to a resolution of the strike-threatening dispute.
V. ACCOMMODATION OF RELIGIOUS BELIEFS
The legislation, as finally enacted, contains an exemption from
compulsory membership in or support of a labor organization for
those employees who decline such in response to legitimate religious
convictions .13 An employee who, due to his religious teaching or
"1 Section 19 provides:
Any employee of a health care institution who is a member of and adheres to
established and traditional tenets or teachings of a bona fide religion, body, or sect
which has historically held conscientious objections to joining or financially support-
ing labor organizations shall not be required to join or financially support any labor
organization as a condition of employment, except that such employee may be
required, in lieu of periodic dues and initiation fees, to pay sums equal to such dues
and initiation fees to a nonreligious charitable fund exempt from taxation under
section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, chosen by such employee from a list
HEALTH CARE INSTITUTIONS
belief, is given the opportunity to avoid financial support for member-
ship in a labor organization without the fear of discharge from his
employment, must nonetheless make a financial sacrifice equal to
that of his unionized counterparts by contributing an equivalent
amount of money to a qualified "nonreligious charitable fund."
This exemption arises from the recognition that certain religious
organizations oppose the concept of unionization and that their ap-
plicable religious dogma precludes membership in labor organiza-
tions. Significantly, the impact of organized religion in the health
services field is substantial.'34 Moreover, religious beliefs are gener-
ally accommodated throughout the legislative framework, in accord-
ance with the demands of the First Amendment.
Senator Ervin presented an amendment which would have pro-
vided that the new legislation removing the previous exemption would
not apply to "any corporation or other association operating a hospi-
tal, if that hospital is owned, supported, controlled or managed by a
particular religion or by a particular religious corporation or
association." That is, all employees of religiously owned or operated
hospitals would be completely exempted from coverage. The amend-
ment was rejected.
The chief concern in this area appears to be for the Seventh Day
Adventists, who operate numerous non-profit hospitals in nineteen
of at least three such funds, designated in a contract between such institution and a
labor organization, or if the contract fails to designate such funds, then to any such
fund chosen by the employee.
It should be noted that any employer violates § 8(a)(3) of the Act by refusing to allow an
employee to discharge obligations arising under union security agreements by tendering dues
and initiation fees, but without formally joining the union. A union cannot compel an employer
to discharge an employee, and an employer may not acquiese in such action, except for instan-
ces where the employee fails to pay required dues or fees. Hershey Foods Corp., 207 N.L.R.B.
No. 141, 85 L.R.R.M. 1004 (1973). As used in § 8(a)(3), "membership" represents only a
financial obligation, which is limited to the payment of fees and dues. NLRB v. General Motors
Corp., 373 U.S. 734 (1963). Additionally, an employee may not be discharged for his failure
to sign a dues checkoff authorization, as long as there is a valid tender of the dues. American
Screw Co., 122 N.L.R.B. No. 74, 43 L.R.R.M. 1153 (1958). Presumably, rights established
by § 19 of the Act are in addition to these general principles.
"I At least one third of all non-profit hospitals have some religious affiliations. 120
CONG. REc. 6453 (daily ed. May 2, 1974) (remarks of Sen. Javits).
Sen. Cranston pointed out that such hospitals no longer need to rely on their own resources
and the "charitable instincts of the community," as the government has been willing to commit
"significant resources" in the form of subsidies and grants to these institutions. He stated:
As for their respective employment relationships, each hospital must compete for the
same labor market since religiously affiliated hospitals no longer depend on recruit-
ing exclusively from members of their religious order or persuasion. Because of their
markedly similar operating and administrative structure, both religious and nonreli-
giously affiliated hospitals draw upon the existing manpower pool to fill their ranks.
120 CONG. REC. 6952 (daily ed. May 2, 1974).
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states and the District of Columbia.'35 This particular church teaches
its members not to belong to or contribute support to a labor organi-
zation. The amendment protects the employee whose religion dictates
against union membership or support; it does not effectively relieve
the religiously-affiliated employer of related theoretical confronta-
tions. Thus the more narrow exemption recognized in the enacted law
does not vitiate the dilemma faced by the church in deciding whether
to recognize a union in one of their hospitals or whether to bargain
with the union, once certified. It does relieve the member-employee
from the uncomfortable situation in which he would have to ignore
the teachings of his religion in order to retain his employment."'
Clauses similar to the language of the statute are not unknown
in existing collective bargaining agreements. The AFL-CIO Execu-
tive Council, for example, has urged 'its affiliates to "adopt proce-
dures for respecting sincere personal religious convictions as to union
membership or activities."1 37 Consequently, clauses have been ac-
cepted in collective bargaining agreements which provide'that fees
and dues may be paid to non-religious charities. Such clauses often
are less restrictive than the amendment, allowing individual consci-
ence and religious beliefs to control, rather than being restricted to
membership in a religious sect that has "historically" held such objec-
tions. Naturally, such provisions may still be negotiated by the par-
ties, although the explicit language of the statute may restrict the
parties' willingness to broaden the exemption provided.
Reliance on the enacted language, rather than the collective bar-
gaining capacities of the parties, necessitates enforcement and polic-
ing by the third-party government agency, instead of the immediate
"I The Seventh Day Adventists operate approximately forty-six hospitals in the country,
comprising less than one percent of the hospital bed capacity in the United States. 120 CONG.
REc. 6953 (daily ed. May 2, 1974). The Catholic Hospital Association, comprised of over 850
hospitals (with approximately 160,000 beds, 360,000 employees, and over forty-five million
patient days of care in 1972) adopted an official policy that would recognize the right of hospital
employees to form or join a union, and recommended that their member hospitals recognize
this employee right. 120 CONG. REc. 5964 (daily ed. May 2, 1974).
"I The exemption may also provide relief to the employer caught between the Scylla of
a union security clause and the Charybdis of an employee with protected religious beliefs. In
the recent decision General Color & Chemical Co., Inc. and International Brotherhood of
Pottery & Allied Workers, 2 C.C.H. Empl. Prac. Guide 5260 (1974), the Ohio Civil Rights
Commission found that an employer practiced unlawful religious discrimination where it dis-
charged an employee who refused, on religious grounds, to comply with the union security
clause, and where the employer made no attempt to accommodate the employee's religious
beliefs. The labor union involved was also found to have engaged in unlawful religious discrimi-
nation when it demanded discharge of the employee without attempting the required accomoda-
tion.
,, 120 CONG. REC. 7287 (daily ed. May 7, 1974).
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parties to the employment relationship. While the Senate elected not
to include language that would also exempt employees with conscien-
tious objections "based on religious training and beliefs in relation
to a supreme being involving duties superior to those arising from any
human relation,"' 13 even a cursory reading of the enacted exemption
provides a premonition of the ongoing dispute-resolution role of the
NLRB. Particularly agonizing interpretations must give flesh and
sinew to the skeletal frame provided.
The statutory language fails to articulate standards to govern the
application of the various imprecise concepts stated in the law. The
initial findings that the employer is a member, and that he actually
adheres to teachings of, a "bona fide religion" will be required. Such
a fact finding process will presumably be necessary either where the
exemption is actually claimed, or upon filing of unfair labor practices
by the employee whose claim has been rejected, or whose employ-
ment has been terminated. Meaning must be given to the term "his-
torically held conscientious objections."'39 The burden of proof that
the employee does, in fact, possess such beliefs, as well as for other
issues associated with the exemption, will fall to the employee.'
It should also be recognized that the legislation does not unilat-
erally impose a union on such employees: the fact remains that a
majority of the employees of any health care institution must vote to
accept the union representative.
VI. APPROPRIATE BARGAINING UNITS
Section 9 of the Act gives the Board the power to determine the
appropriate unit for bargaining, by providing that the collective bar-
gaining agent selected by a majority of the employees "in a unit
appropriate for such purposes" shall be the exclusive representative
of all of the employees in the designated unit.'4'
As the strategic predictions of employee sympathies often influ-
ence pre-election actions of both the employer and the union, the size
M 120 CONG. REc. 7287 (daily ed. May 7, 1974) (amendment proposed by Sen. Domin-
ick).
The General Counsel has affirmed the view that a valid union security obligation may be
enforced where the employee's refusal to join the union is based on individual beliefs rather
than a reliance on any "historically held conscientious objections" of the religion. The amend-
ment's exception regarding union security agreements, being of a limited nature, was deter-
mined to be unavailable where there was no showing that Roman Catholicism is a religion
which has such historically held objections to joining or financially supporting labor organiza-
tions. General Counsel Monthly Report on Health Care Institution Cases, Second Report,
Section IV, 88 L.R.R. 105 (1975).
" 120 CoNG. REc. 7291 (daily ed. May 7, 1974) (remarks of Sen. Dominick).
,II 29 U.S.C. § 159.
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and composition of the unit is not uncommonly a point of differing
proposals and disputes between the parties. Under the Act, the Board
is given the authority (and the courts have granted wide discretionary
latitude to the Board),"' to make determinations regarding appropri-
ate employee groupings In exercising its discretion in this area, the
Board considers and balances various factors.
One of the most important of these factors is embodied in the
"community of interests" concept. Under this doctrine, the Board
will attempt to combine those employees who share "substantial mu-
tual interests in wages, hours and other conditions of employ-
ment." '143 Considerations within this generic description include the
method by which wage scales are determined, benefits enjoyed, num-
ber of working hours, method of supervision, requisite qualifications
and skills of the employees, actual job functions, work responsibilities
away from the employer's premises, degree of interaction with other
employees, and the bargaining history of the employees. 4, Other
factors in the determination of an appropriate unit include the history
of bargaining of the group of employees under consideration," 5 de-
sires of the employees,' the nature and organizational structure of
the employer's business, 47 statutory considerations,'48 and the interest
of the public.41
"I The Board's decision will generally not be modified unless it is shown to be arbitrary
or capricious. May Dep't. Stores Co. v. N.L.R.B., 326 U.S. 276 (1945). Section 9(b) also
imposes specific statutory limitations on the Board's ability to exercise an entirely unfettered
discretion. Pursuant to this section the Board may not (a) combine professional and non-
professional employees in the same unit (unless the professional employees evince such a
desire); (b) find a unit to be inappropriate due to a past determination; or (c) include guards
and other employees in the same unit.
"s Fifteenth Annual Report of the NLRB, 39 (1950).
'" Kalamazoo Paper Box Corp., 136 N.L.R.B. 134 49 L.R.R.M. 1715 (1962).
" See, e.g., Buckeye Village Market, Inc., 175 N.L.R.B. 46, 70 L.R.R.M. 1529 (1969).
Obviously, the length of the bargaining history is an important element to be considered. For
example, the Board has held that a fourteen month history of craft bargaining did not exclu-
sively establish a pattern of bargaining. Phelps Dodge Corp., 98 N.L.R.B. 726, 29 L.R.R.M.
1405 (1952).
"I This factor will be of heightened importance where there are other indications that two
or more units are appropriate. This element was given the imprimatur of Supreme Court
approval in Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 146, 156 (1940).
"I Where independent units possess a substantial amount of autonomy, reflecting separate
interests of the employees, the Board will fragment the employer's work force. See NLRB v.
Kostel Corp., 440 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1971) and Jackson Manor Nursing Home, 194 N.L.R.B.
152, 79 L.R.R.M. 1166 (1972).
"' See note 134 supra.
"' In NLRB v. Delaware-New Jersey Ferry Co., 128 F.2d 130 (3rd Cir. 1942), the Court
would not enforce a Board determination that grouped both deckhands and ship officers work-
ing for a ferry company in the same unit. In language that could be applicable to the health
care institution situation, the Court stated:
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The scope of the unit is often the focal point of disagreement
between the employer and the union, because in many instances it is
a significant factor in the determination of the union's majority sta-
tus or its ability to present the requisite thirty per cent showing of
interest to compel an election. Therefore, the union will often seek
to petition for the largest possible unit where it is anticipated that it
has a good prospect of winning an election. Conversely, the likelihood
of losing the broader-based election will dictate that the unit sought
will be small. In the alternative, the employer may seek to shape or
mold the projected bargaining unit, dependent upon its foreseeable
strengths or weaknesses in the proposed grouping. However, it is
suspected that conclusions as to the appropriate unit are often prem-
ised only on immediate election strategy. The ongoing ability of the
institution to manage and administer a labor contract within a large
unit or to cope with the frequency of bargaining and diverse nature
of many small units must be considered in this regard.
Experience has shown that in the usual circumstance, the health
service employer often seeks an all-employee unit,15 while the union
will attempt to fragment the employees into smaller groupings classi-
fied along general skill or job function considerations. A prevalent
pattern in hospital situations is for the union to segregate five dis-
trinct units: registered nurses, licensed practical nurses, technical
employees, clerical employees, and service and maintenance employ-
ees (including nurses aides and orderlies)."'
[T]he point here is not what the officers want, nor what the men want, nor what the
company either wants or is willing to acquiese in, but rather, what is the public
interest. The Board's duty to serve the public interest cannot be affected by the
desires or acquiesence of the parties.
Senator Taft stated that "there is a definite need for the Board to examine the public
interest in determining appropriate bargaining units" in the health care institution, citing
Delaware-New Jersey Ferry Co. for support of this proposition. 120 CoNG. REc. 7311 (daily
ed. May 7, 1974).
"- The employer's desire that the unit be large may be an election strategy premised on
the suspicion that the varying socio-economic patterns and associations of the wide range of
employees in a health care institution may compel rejection of a union on a visceral identifica-
tion level. For example, while licensed practical nurses and technically-skilled employees may
emotionally spurn membership in unions which traditionally represent the blue collar worker
(e.g., the Laborers' or Teamsters' unions), their less skilled counterparts may identify with such
groups, to the exclusion of other interested unions.
In North Dade Hospital, 210 N.L.R.B. No. 82, 86 L.R.R.M. 1261 (1974), the employer
sought a unit including almost all employees asserting that all of their efforts were directed
toward treatment of patients, that they worked in close proximity, and that they enjoyed
identical fringe benefits. In Madeira Nursing Center, 203 N.L.R.B. No. 42, 83 L.R.R.M. 1033
(1973), the union sought a unit composed of all employees except registered nurses and licensed
practical nurses. The employer argued that these employees should not be excluded.
"I See testimony of Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Workers' Union, as dis-
cussed in Madeira Nursing Center, supra note 142.
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The typical health care institution employer will contend that an
overall unit is appropriate, as the principal function of all the employ-
ees is directly related to providing the wide spectrum of patient care,
including emergency, diagnostic, medical, surgical and other related
services. Reinforcement for the overall unit argument is supplied by
the legislative directive that fragmentation into smaller units should
be denied, due to the increased possibility of life-endangering strikes
if not for other considerations.
The union's response is frequently that the requested smaller unit
is not only a distinct and homogeneous unit, but one which provides
services which can be segregated from, and which are merely suppor-
tive of, the institution's principal service of direct patient care. The
ultimate decision, of course, will depend upon the particular facts of
each case.52
The recent metamorphosis of the law does not create any specific
provision for definition of appropriate units in the hospital situation.
Both CommitteeReports state that "due consideration should be
given by the Board to preventing proliferation of bargaining units in
the health care industry."'13 Senator Dominick, in his personal view
appended to the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare
Report, emphasized that the bill did not adequately recognize the
need for special treatment of the hospital industry and reaffirmed
that a proliferation of bargaining units can pose a "serious threat to
uninterrupted health care."'5
'5 The Board and the courts will often find units of less than all of the employees to be
appropriate. See, e.g., St. Joseph's Infirmary, 194 N.L.R.B. 495, 86 L.R.R.M. 1261 (1974)
(unit of dietary, maintenance, laundry and housekeeping employees found appropriate despite
employer's claim that only an overall unit was appropriate); Syosset General Hospital, 190
N.L.R.B. 304, 77 L.R.R.M. 1121 (1971) (separate unit for technicians and clerical employees
found appropriate); Labor Relations Comm. v. University Hosp., Inc., 269 N.E.2d 682, 77
L.R.R.M. 2374 (1971) (skilled tradesman of maintenance department of hospital found to be
appropriate unit).
The propriety of including the administrative or office-clerical departments in the bargain-
ing unit will depend on the employee's classification on the payroll, the nature of the job
performed, the portion of the work day spent in the office setting, other employees with whom
the employee comes in contact, interchange of duties and and functions (and if so, with whom),
and a comparison of hours worked and pay scales. See, e.g., New Fairview Hall Convalescent
Home, 206 N.L.R.B. No. 108, 85 L.R.R.M. 1227 (1973). (records clerk, emergency room
clerks status in appropriate unit discerned, where Board investigated nature of clerical func-
tions, involvement with employees concerned with treatment of patients, time spent in patient
care area, and relationship of services performed to care and treatment of patients); St. Joseph's
Infirmary, supra, (dispatch service department employees and mailroom and distribution center
employees included in overall unit); Jackson Manor Nursing Home, supra note 139 (reception-
ist, admissions employees, clerks and bookkeepers excluded from unit due to classification as
office clericals).
m S. RaP. No. 766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1974).
" S. REP. No. 766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 45 (1974) (individual views of Sen. Dominick),
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The fear of the potential effect of sanctioning a great number of
units in the health care situation was expressed during the congres-
sional debates. Senator Taft remarked that hospitals and similar
health care institutions
are particularly vulnerable to a multiplicity of bargaining units due
to the diversified nature of the medical services provided patients.
If each professional interest and job classification is permitted to
form a separate bargaining unit, numerous administrative and labor
relations problems become involved in the delivery of health care.'
Senator Taft introduced a provision which would have placed a statu-
tory limit of four bargaining units in a health care institution. The
language was rejected, but the result was the admonition in the Com-
mittee Reports that explicitly instructs the Board to attempt to limit
the number of bargaining units present in these instances.
Senator Williams admitted that the Committees clearly intended
that the Board should be cognizant of the potential dangers lurking
where many units exist in the health care institution, but he expressed
the view that the Board has traditionally exercised good judgment in
establishing units, expecially in the situation of a newly-covered in-
dustry. Senator Williams stated:
While the Board has, as a rule, tended to avoid an unnecessary
proliferation of collective bargaining units, sometimes circumstan-
ces require that there be a number of bargaining units among non-
supervisory employees, particularly where there is such a history in
the area or a notable disparity of interests between employees in
different job classifications."'
Although some support for the proposition that the various skills
and interests in the health care institution should be represented in
different bargaining units may be drawn from the congressional rejec-
tion of a statutory limit on the possible number of units, the clear
indication of the Committee Reports and legislative history is that
while the Board is left to exercise its informed discretion in the deci-
sion, the nature of the health care industry warrants a special attempt
to limit the number of bargaining units established.
The Committee Reports specifically approved of Board deci-
sions in Four Seasons Nursing Center5 ' and Woodland Park
Hospital."8 In Four Season, an election petition was presented
He would favor specific statutory language to minimize the number of bargaining units.
120 CoNG. REc. 6940 (daily ed. May 2, 1974).
'" 120 CONG. REC. 1210 (daily ed. July 10, 1974).
"5 208 N.L.R.B. No. 50, 85 L.R.R.M. 1093 (1974).
"' 205 N.L.R.B. No. 144, 84 L.R.R.M. 1075 (1973).
36 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL 235 (1975)
wherein the union sought to represent two employees in the mainte-
nance department (there were approximately 140 other employees).
It was declared that the maintenance employees were not a distinct
and homogeneous group with interests separate from those of the
other employees, and that the duties performed did not require a high
degree of skill or training that would justify finding a distinct unit.
Similarly, in Woodland Park Hospital, the union took the posi-
tion that an all-employee unit was inappropriate and urged that three
separate units be declared (all.clericals, all technical employees, and
all other employees). The Regional Director found that employees in
the proposed units did not possess sufficiently separate and distin-
guishable interests to warrant finding the three units appropriate. The
Board concluded that a finding of a separate unit of X-ray technicians
in this instance would lead to "severe fragmentation" of units in the
health care industry. In doing so, the Board overruled a previous
ruling that found a unit of "radiological technologists" appropriate,
despite the claim that the unit should encompass employees in other
technical classifications. 1"9
While the Committee Reports also expressed approval for the
trend toward broad units enunciated in the Extendicare of West
Virginia decision, 6" the particular holding in that decision was "not
necessarily" adopted. In Extendicare, the petitioning union sought to
represent three separate units: licensed practical nurses, technical
employees, and service and maintenance employees. The employer
contended that only an all-employee unit would be appropriate and
sought to add some clerical employees excluded by the union. The
Board found that the licensed practical nurses had a community of
interests distinct from the other employees, and that they therefore
constituted an appropriate separate unit. However, the Board contin-
ued to find that, in light of the separate LPN unit and the minimum
number of technical employees involved, the technical employees and
the service and maintenance employees constituted a single appropri-
ate unit. Presaging the hesitation expressed in the Committee Re-
ports, Member Kennedy dissented on the ground that he considered
the over-all unit sought by the employer to be appropriate."' He was
aware of no precedent that would countenance splitting a comprehen-
sive unit into segments where there is only one union involved and
where no prior history of collective bargaining exists.
"I Ochsner Clinic, 192 N.L.R.B. 1059, 78 L.R.R.M. 1038 (1971).
11 203 N.L.R.B. No. 170, 83 L.R.R.M. 1242 (1973).
"I The all-employee unit, excepting office clericals and standard exclusions (supervisors,
professionals, guards, etc.) was found to be an appropriate unit in Butte Medical Properties
(Medical Center Hospital), supra note 11.
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The fear of unit fragmentation has special importance in the
health care industry, given the wide range of employee classifications
and skill levels which exists and the various labor organizations that
seek to represent those diverse workers."' Units are determined by
imprecise phrases such as "distinct and separate interests" and
"distinct and homogeneous group." These standards encourage
forensic duels over factual criteria, and the asserted requisite quan-
tum of shared interests (or lack thereof) has a tendency to vary as
the vagaries of election strategy dictate.
Thus, it would be prudent to interpret the new legislation as
favoring a limited number of bargaining units. The necessary flexibil-
ity to determine appropriate units must repose in the NLRB, but the
mandate to make those determinations with regard to the congres-
sionally approved precedents should often tip the balance in the favor
of broadened units. Unwarranted unit fragmentation is the harbinger
of frequent jurisdictional disputes and consequent work disruptions.
The cost and administrative complications of coping with various
unions and obligations, in light of the public nature of the industry,
must also be considered. Moreover, "leap frogging" and "whipsaw-
ing" of employers by different trade unions, which occurs, for exam-
ple, in the construction industry, must not be permitted to jeopardize
the public interest inherent in continued health care.1 3
lZ For example, the Ohio Hospital Association testified before the Subcommittee on
Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare that there are at least twenty
"... different professional and technical groups which have indicated an interest in
representing their members in collective bargaining in hospitals. In addition, craft
unions . . could be expected to seek representation rights for hospital employees
performing craft-related work, as well as unions representing employees in specific
types of hospital-related industries .....
Due to the fact that the vast majority of the nation's more than 1.5 million workers
employed in private hospitals are presently unorganized, it is unquestioned that many unions
will attempt to attract new members among that group. For example, the July 29, 1974, Wall
Street Journal reports that officials of the Service Employees International Union, which
already represents 200,000 health-care workers, speak of an expansion in this area that would
possibly double its size within the next few years.
Major organizing efforts are expected from a multitude of existing unions, ostensibly
unrelated to health care employees, such as the Laborers International Union, the American
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, and the International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffers, Warehousemen and Helpers of America. The Retail, Wholesale and
Department Store Union already has an existing affiliation with the National Union of Hospi-
tal and Health-Care Employees, and the Retail Clerks International Association has spawned
a division to organize not only rank-and-file hospital personnel but also doctors, nurses, phar-
macists, lab technicians, and licensed practical nurses. In the first election under the new law,
the Firemen and Oilers Union won the right to represent forty supply and distribution workers
at a Kansas City Hospital. Wall Street Journal, October 8, 1974, at 1, col. 5.
', See the remarks of Sen. Taft in 120 CONG. REc. 6941 (daily ed. May 2, 1974).
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VII. SPECIAL STATUS OF HEALTH CARE INSTITUTIONS
A. Continuity of Health Services
The unique and vital service provided by health care institutions
merits special consideration to insure its uninterrupted availability.114
Although some commentators were not alarmed by the potential of
work stoppages in the health industry,"6 5 the prevailing view was that
the essential nature of health care functions required efforts designed
to minimize the likelihood of disrupted patient services.'66 The Com-
mittee Reports reflected this concern by stating that Congress ex-
pected that the Board would give "special attention and priority" to
unfair labor practice charges in the health care situation, "consistent
with existing statutory priority requirements for particular classes of
cases."' 67
The Committees noted the existence of priority case treatment
by the Board under § 10(1) of the Act, involving charges filed under
§§ 8(b)(4) (secondary picketing), 8(b)(7) (recognitional picketing) and
8(e) ("hot cargo" agreements), as well as other existing priority direc-
tives under § 10(m).16' Additionally, the Committees enunciated the
policy that appropriate investigatory and related resources be
developed to insure the requisite priority to health care institution
problems or disruptions.
The General Counsel promptly reacted to the congressional
suggestion, and announced the following priority schedule:
"I The Ohio Hospital Association, in its appearance before the Subcommittee on Labor
of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, warned that extension of jurisdiction
to the hospital employer may have a drastic detrimental effect on the public, in that a hospital
may be faced with situations where it cannot provide "uninterrupted care to its patients." The
Association, not unnaturally, places the public's right to health care above the right of employ-
ers to regulate union activity and the right of employees to engage in concerted activity.
Testimony of the Ohio Hospital Association, Hearings on S794 Before the Subcomm. on Labor
of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., Aug. 2, 1973.
£65 See, e.g., the remarks of Rep. Thompson, at 120 CONG. REC. 4588 (daily ed. May 30,
1974), where he expressed the view that the unions involved in the hospital industry are "ex-
traordinarily responsible" and have "invariably" not engaged in strike activity unless adequate
care for patients was guaranteed. He concluded: "So there is really nothing but an illusory
danger that the medical support needed by so many citizens would be deprived .... "
£6 For example, Senator Dominick did not deem the issue as frivolous as Representative
Thompson did, and in his personal view appended to the Senate Report, S. REP. No. 93-766,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1974), the Senator quoted at length newspaper articles pointing out
the need to provide speedy solutions to impasses between labor and management in the health
care industry.




1. Initial consideration must be given to statutory priorities found
in Sections 10(1) and 10(m) of the Act. Therefore, nonhealth care
charges arising under the provisions outlined in those sections will
receive attention before non-priority cases involving the health care
industry.
2. As between non-health care and health care cases, both of
which involve charges warranting priority under Sections 10(1) or
10(m), the health care charge is to receive priority.
3. As between non-health care and health care cases, neither of
which involve charges warranting priority under Sections 10(1) and
10(m), the health care cases will be handled first."'
B. Solicitation and Distribution Rules of Health Care Institutions
In an effort to provide a degree of certainty and stability in the
arena of organizational activities, the NLRB has developed a set of
presumptions concerning the appropriateness of employer rules about
solicitation of union membership and distribution of union literature.
They are based on the nature of the activity (distribution of literature
or solicitation), whether the activists are employees or outside union
organizers, the time and place of the activity in question, and whether
the activity interferes with production, plant discipline, or cleanliness.
The recognition of the special status of health care institutions may
lead to the creation of modified standards for these institutions.
For example, in recognition that some employment situations
present unique circumstances, employers in certain industries have
been permitted to impose more stringent no-solicitation and distribu-
tion rules than would be deemed permissible in more normal cases.
Broad no-solicitation and/or distribution rules have been justified by
the need to keep the premises "clean and orderly or the need to
maintain discipline";17 to maintain production and discipline within
the plant;"' to prevent accidents;' to prevent the creation of a hostile
atmosphere incompatible with good working conditions;7 3 for pur-
poses of good housekeeping, safety, and fire prevention;7 and to
"I N.L.R.B. General Counsel, supra note 30, Senator Taft had proposed language for the
amendments which would have dealt statutorily with the question of priority handling. The
proposal was dropped because the Senate Committee was of the opinion that the existing
statutory language was sufficient. Senator Taft was confident that the Board would act "with
the greatest expedition" in health care cases, especially in consideration of the fact that delay
may cost human lives. 120 CONG. REC. 6941 (daily ed. May 2, 1974).
"I United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 243 F.2d 593 (D.C. Cir. 1956), rev'd on other grounds,
357 U.S. 357 (1958).
' Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
" F. P. Adams Co., 166 N.L.R.B. 967, 65 L.R.R.M. 1695 (1967).
in Stuart F. Cooper Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 142, 49 L.R.R.M. 1729 (1962).
' Kom Industries, Inc. v. NLRB, 389 F.2d 117 (4th Cir. 1967).
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avoid detrimental effects on the employer's business resulting from
organizational efforts.'75 The rules imposed by the employer must be
designed and intended not to limit significantly employee rights but,
rather, to provide protection for legitimate employer interests.
The necessary approach to questions of broad no-solicitation
rules is to examine the discussed presumptions and rebuttals, based
on the facts of the individual cases. An employer may prohibit solici-
tation during working time (as opposed, perhaps, to "working
hours"),'76 but prohibitions extending to periods outside working time
(before or after work, meal or break times, etc.) will be presumed to
be an unreasonable impediment or restraint on employee rights of
self-organization guaranteed by § 7 of the Act. In this latter instance,
the burden falls to the employer to rebut the presumption of invalidity
with evidence that "special circumstances" make the broad rule nec-
essary. Conversely, if a presumptively valid rule is promulgated (for
example, on that limits solicitation during employees' work time),
this presumption can be rebutted by a showing that the rule was
adopted for a discriminatory purpose, whereupon the employer must
then prove that the rule, although discriminatory, was nonetheless
necessary to maintain production or discipline.'77
The Board and the courts are not timid in striking down manage-
ment activity which is calculated to undermine a union's attempt to
achieve an electoral majority among the employees. Special scrutiny
is deemed necessary in order to counterbalance the power inherent
in the employer's position vis-a-vis his employees so that the exercise
of organizational rights guaranteed to employees is not inhibited or
prevented. Therefore, unjustified broad prohibitions, or those of un-
certain dimensions, being naturally abusive of employee rights, are
readily struck down. 78
"I Marshall Field & Co., 98 N.L.R.B. 88, 29 L.R.R.M. 1305 (1952), modified, 200 F.2d
375 (7th Cir. 1952).
17 If a rule can reasonably be interpreted to preclude solicitation activities during break
times, lunch periods, and other times where the employee is not actually working, the Board
has frequently held it to be invalid. The term "working hours," "company time," and other
ambiguous descriptions may be considered so imprecise as to preclude enforcement, because
the clear effect of a broad ambiguous rule is to inhibit organizational efforts. NLRB v. WKRG-
TV, Inc., 470 F.2d 1302 (5th Cir. 1973); Swisher & Son, Inc., 211 N.L.R.B. No. 114, 87
L.R.R.M. 1123 (1974); Ohio Masonic Home, 205 N.L.R.B. No. 65, 83 L.R.R.M. 1665 (1973);
Cedar Corp. (West Side Manor Nursing Home), 203 N.L.R.B. No, 33, 83 L.R.R.M. 1159
(1973). See also the discussion at note 175, infra.
I" Heritage House, 192 N.L.R.B. 1081, 78 L.R.R.M. 1114 (1971).
17s The broadest statement of the need to protect employee rights appears in the Board
decision in Daylin, Inc., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 40, 81 L.R.R.M. 1145 (1972), where an employer's
rule prohibited all solicitations on the premises during paid working hours. The majority
(Members Fanning, Jenkins and Penello) stated that the Act protected the rights of employees
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In considering application of the "special circumstances" doc-
trine to the health care situation, the Board and the courts are not in
agreement. The courts, exhibiting the same tendency they have in the
retail store situation, are more prone to accept broad employer prohi-
bitions on solicitation and distributions than is the Board.
The Board has taken the position, in Summit Nursing and Con-
valescent Home,7' that although a broad restriction may be lawful
where extraordinary circumstances are shown, no special needs that
would justify a limitation on the self-organization rights of employees
are present in the convalescent home situation.'
In Summit Nursing, the employer's rule read:
In order to give our undivided attention to the job of caring for our
patients, no employee shall engage in solicitation for any cause or
distribute literature of any kind during an employee's working time
at any place in the home. No employee should engage in solicitation
or distribution of literature at any time in the patient or public area
within the home, or in the nurses' stations. No employee shall dis-
tribute literature for any cause in working areas of the home, at any
time.
The Board found that the rule did not meet the rules enunciated in
Stoddard-Quirk"' for the valid prohibition of the distribution of liter-
ature, because the rule could be interpreted to cover activities during
non-working time. Finding the rule ambiguous in this respect, the
Board held (in* line with the weight of precedent)' that the risk of
the ambiguity must be borne by the employer as the framer of the
rule.'"s The Board held that the rule was presumptively invalid and
to solicit, even during working time, as long as there is no resulting interference with produc-
tion. Any prohibition of solicitation must be justified by an affirmative showing of an impair-
ment of production.
Member Kennedy dissented, being of the opinion that an employer can lawfully insist that
"working time is for work" and that employees may be disciplined for neglecting their work
to engage in solicitation activities. Without evidence to suggest that the rule was enforced to
prohibit solicitation in non-work time or non-work (non-selling) areas, Member Kennedy would
find no § 8(a)(1) violation. (Chairman Miller also dissented).
"I Summit Nursing and Convalescent Home, 196 N.L.R.B. 769, 80 L.R.R.M. 1069
(1972).
" See also, the Board decision in Monterey Life Systems Bellaire Gen. Hosp., 203
N.L.R.B. No. 151, 83 L.R.R.M. 1291 (1973), dealing with solicitation in hospitals.
"I Stoddard-Quirk Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 615, 51 L.R.R.M. 1110 (1962).
2 See, e.g., Miller Charles & Co., 148 N.L.R.B. 1579, 57 L.R.R.M. 1211 (1964), enfd,
341 F.2d 870 (1956) (2d Cir. 1965), and Avon Convalescent Center, 200 N.L.R.B. 99, 82
L.R.R.M., 1233 (1972), and cases cited in note 168 supra.
10 Some question regarding the effect of the ambiguity encountered in Summit Nursing
Home exists as a result of the recent Board decision in Essex International, Inc., 211 N.L.R.B.
No. 112, 86 L.R.R.M. 1411 (1974), where the employer had prohibited solicitation during
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that no special justifications warranted a broad no-solicitation rule,
as the prohibited activities did not endanger the health and welfare
of the patients, create a litter problem," 4 or interfere with the opera-
tion of the home.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found
the employer's rule to be reasonable and, in denying enforcement of
the Board order, adopted the rulings of the Trial Examiner. 8 5 The
Trial Examiner had held that the rule was intended to prohibit solici-
tation in all public areas within the home, including the lobbies and
the patients' dining rooms. The ruling affirmed by the Court was that
any possible presumptions of invalidity were overcome by the nature
of the operations of the home and the special conditions involved.
Because a large percentage of the patients were in advanced stages
of senility, requiring constant care and attention, activities diverting
the attention of the employees (the union organizing campaign)
would interfere with the proper performance of employee duties.
The holding adopted by the Court, then, was that a broad solici-
tation and distribution prohibition was reasonable. It was justified by
the special nature of employee activities required for the care of
patients in a convalescent home and the possible prejudice to the
"work time" and distributions "in work areas or during work time." In the "majority" opinion,
Chairman Miller (consistent with his previsous dissents in this regard) and Member Kennedy
found a clear distinction between the terms "working hours," the time interval between report-
ing for work and the end of the shift, and "working time," the time spent actually performing
job functions (thereby excluding break times, eating periods, etc.). A rule prohibiting solicita-
tion during "working hours" would be presumptively invalid, they opined, while the prohibition
during "working time" would be presumed valid, as it would "clearly convey" that employees
would be free to engage in the activities in question during those time that they were not actually
working.
The ruling was facilitated by evidence showing that the understanding of the employees
was consonant with this interpretation, as solicitation had actually occurred during lunchtimes
and breaks. Members Fanning and Jenkins dissented, on the ground that the rule was too
ambiguous to convey effectively the lesser restraint, and that it was therefore invalid.
This decision would appear to overrule previous Board rulings construing these terms and
holding restrictions applied to "working time" invalid. However, one of these previous contrary
rulings was in the Avon Convalescent case, roughly four months prior to the Essex decision,
where the Board decision was affirmed in the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, in whose jurisdic-
tion the Essex International, Inc. plant is located. The Essex construction of the term "working
time" was subsequently upheld in General Motors Corp., 211 N.L.R.B. No. 123, 87 L.R.R.M.
1167 (1974).
I" In addition to the right to prohibit distribution of literature in non-working areas during
working time, and working areas at all times, Stoddard-Quirk Mfg. Co., supra note 173, an
employer may prohibit distribution performed "in such a manner so as to litter the plant."
Litton Industries, 192 N.L.R.B. 793, 78 L.R.R.M. 1041 (1971), enforced, 465 F.2d 104 (3d
Cir. 1972); Genessee Merchants Bank and Trust Co., 206 N.L.R.B. No. 74, 84 L.R.R.M. 1237
(1973).
"I NLRB v. Summit Nursing Home, 472 F.2d 1380 (6th Cir. 1973).
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health and welfare of these patients, caused by the solicitation and
distribution efforts of employees and union organizers."'
For some time after the Summit Nursing and Convalescent
Home decision, the Board consistently struck down broad no-
solicitation rules at health care institutions. 87 However, in Guyan
Valley Hospital,"' the Board adopted the findings of the Trial Exam-
iner, who upheld a rule prohibiting solicitation in hospital working
areas. The Trial Examiner extended the "working area" of the hospi-
tal to those areas necessarily open to the use of patients and their
visitors and allowed the rule to encompass those locations because
patients and visitors might reasonably be upset by employee argu-
ments regarding union matters.
The question that must be squarely confronted is the justifiable
extent of the no-solicitation rule in the health care institution: may
such an employer forbid solicitation, at any time, in those sections
of the premises occupied and frequented by patients and the public?
Framed more expansively, what are "non-work" areas for purposes
of distribution of literature,'89 and will the "special circumstances"
I The ruling that special application to the efforts involved in union organizational cam-
paigns as evidenced by the rejected Board order, which the Board justified by the fact that
previous solicitations had been permitted to collect funds for gifts for departing employees or
for employees to display commercial sales articles.
,17 In Cedar Corp. (West Side Manor Nursing Home, supra, note 168, the Board found
no "valid basis" for excepting the case at hand from the presumptive illegality of prohibiting
solicitation during non-working time, "particularly in non-working areas," and it treated union
solicitation was no different from other forms of solicitation (citing the Board decision in
Summit Nursing and Convalescent Home). In this instance, an employee distributed union
cards and leaflets on the public sidewalk outside of the home on her off-duty hours. The
employer argued that the solicitations in the home and on the public sidewalks were properly
prohibited at all times because they would tend to have a disturbing impact on the psychiatric
patients of the home. Based on evidence regarding the normal activities and outside exposure
of the patients, the Board rejected this argument.
In Extendicare of Kentucky, Inc. (St. Joseph's Infirmary), supra note 144, the Board
found, without comment, that a rule which prohibited solicitation or distribution on the prem-
ises of the hospital was invalid, as it was thought to be broad enought to interdict solicitation
by employees on the premises during non-work time and distribution of literature by employees
during non-work time in non-work areas.
lu Guyan Valley Hospital, 198 N.L.R.B. No. 28, 81 L.R.R.M. 1023 (1972). The Board
attempted to distinguish the Summit Nursing Home decision on the facts that the rule in that
instance had been adopted in response to a union campaign, where as in Guyan Valley Hospital
it was adopted beforehand and, further, that the hospital rule prohibited solicitation only in
the hospital's "working area" (rather than all "patient or public" areas).
I The General Counsel has determined that a § 8(a)(1) complaint was warranted where
an employer banned the distribution of literature anywhere on hospital premises, and more
specifically prohibited the distribution of literature at the hospital main entrance and on a
private sidewalk bordering an ambulance emergency runway. The ban on such distribution was
deemed to be presumptively unlawful because it was not limited to work areas. General Counsel
Monthly Report on Health Care Institution Cases, Third Report, Section II, 88 L.R.R. 180
(1975).
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encountered in the health care situation justify a prohibition of solici-
tation broader than only restricting employees' activities on "working
time"?
It is submitted that the "special circumstances" doctrine shouldjustify, in the admittedly unique health care situation, broad no-
solicitation and distribution rules by employers. Present authority
sanctions prohibition of solicitation in sales situations, as well as in
situations where the activity would interfere with employee job per-
formance.
An employer has no obligation to pay employees for time spent
in organizational activities on behalf of a union, absent a contrac-
tually incurred responsibility in that regard."' This is especially true
where the activity will affect and interfere with the customers (pa-
tients) that the employer serves. As soliciting for a union presump-
tively interferes with the work responsibilities of either the solicitor
or the person solicited, when one or both have assigned duties to
attend to,' a rule that prohibits solicitation in working areas during
working hours of the health care institution should be deemed pre-
sumptively valid. This contention is supported by consideration of the
duties performed by the majority of hospital employees, which in-
volve proximity, availability, and frequent interaction with patients
and visitors.
A health care institution is not a manufacturing or industrial
concern. Just as the circumstances in which retail sales occur are
deemed unique,' it should be recognized that many areas of the
health care institution are open to the public and the patients and that
The General Counsel also issued a similar complaint in the instance where the no-
distribution rule did not apply to "employee only" areas, but which prohibited distribution,
among other places, in the hospital cafeteria and coffee shop. The § 8(a)(1) complaint was based
on the facts tht the only areas reserved only for employees in the hospital were small locker
room lounges (which were used by only a small minority of employees), while the vast majority
of the patrons of the cafeteria and coffee shop were employees on non-work status. The General
Counsel noted that no work was performed in the cafeteria and coffee shop, and that these areas
were used almost exclusively by the employees. Reasoning that these areas were analogous to
an employee dining room, which was found to be a non-work areas in Guyan Valley Hospital,
Inc., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 28, 81 L.R.R.M. 1023 (1972), the General Counsel approved the
complaint for the purpose of placing the issue before the Board. In the General Counsel's view,
the mere fact that an area is open to visitors and patients does not justify a ban on distribution,
without a further showing that distribution would be a source of danger to the health of patients
at the facility. General Counsel Monthly Report, Id. Based on the rationale behind the "special
circumstances" doctrine as it was developed in the retail store situation, the requirement that
danger to uninvolved third parties be demonstrated appears subject to challenge.
110 NLRB v. Daylin, Inc., 469 F.2d 484 (6th Cir. 1974).
"I TRW, Inc. v. NLRB, 393 F.2d 771 (5th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Essex Wire Corp., 245
F.2d 589 (9th Cir. 1957).
"2 May Department Stores, 59 N.L.R.B. 976, 15 L.R.R.M. 173 (1944).
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these areas should be designated "working areas" where solicitation
may be forbidden during all operating hours of the institution. The
employer has legitimate concerns that patients and visitors maintain
confidence in the professional competence of the staff and the institu-
tion, that the employees who are charged with the responsibility of
providing the various aspects of patient care not be distracted or
interrupted while discharging their duties, and that the public and
patients not be burdened with involvement in arguments and discus-
sions related to the desirability of union representation. As indicated
in the Guyan Valley decision, the nature of the institution and the
necessity of patient protection should overcome any presumptions of
invalidity of the broad prohibition. Absent a showing of unavailabil-
ity of non-public, non-patient areas in the institution and extreme
difficulty in reaching employees apart from the institution premises,
a broad no-solicitation rule should be enforced. While the organiza-
tional rights of employees cannot be unduly restricted, the unique
demands of the health care situation, involving the presence of unre-
lated third parties (the public), justify establishment of a different
standard for these employers. A health care institution has a right to
expect, and further to insist, that its patients and the public be insu-
lated from union-management dialogues and activities that are not
related to health care. The interaction and co-mingling of patients,
visitors, and employees justifies the broad rule. Principles designed
to accomodate rights of employees who are isolated from the public,
as in the normal manufacturing setting, cannot be arbitrarily en-
grafted onto the health care institution situation.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Sponsors of the new legislation expanding coverage of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act to envelop "health care institutions" in-
sist that the new law will reduce the number of strikes, which are
thought to occur primarily for the object of recognition of the labor
organization, in that industry. In addition, they claim that impending
threats of employee walkouts will be substantially vitiated by the
mandatory mediation provisions of the amendments. The new legisla-
tion appears to be a functional approach designed to allow employers
and employees to share in the fruits of collective bargaining while
recognizing the vagaries of the health care situation and the realities
of the critical need of enduring patient care.
In addition to the salutary novel provisions of the legislation, the
new law will have a significant impact on existing law. The Board and
the courts will be summoned to regulate the competing interests of
labor and management, tempered by the public interest in uninter-
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rupted health care. The amendments explicitly recognize the unique
and distinct nature of the health care industry and, in so doing, have
charged the NLRB and the courts with the continuing responsibility
to protect and enforce the paramount public interest in unhindered
access to effective health care. The legislation is more than a mere
attempt to delineate the relative rights of employer and employee in
the health care institution; it is a mandate that the public interest
remain undiluted and pre-eminent when these three interests must be
balanced.
